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Abstract 
We extend the Altonji and Card (1991) framework for analysing the impact of immigrants on 
natives’ wages from two to three labour types and estimate reduced form wage equations for 
The Netherlands, United Kingdom and Norway. We find very small effects on natives’ wages 
and no dominant robust patterns of substitution and complementarity. Effects on wages of 
earlier immigrants are larger but less reliable. Further work should focus on these own 
effects.   
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1 Introduction 
Since the paper of Grossman (1982), several studies have been conducted on the impact of 
immigration on the host country labour market. Most of these studies concern traditional 
immigration countries like the United States, Canada and Australia (see surveys: Friedberg 
and Hunt, 1995; Borjas, 1994). In Europe, the number of studies is still limited, although 
increasing in the last few years (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1993; De New and 
Zimmermann, 1994; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1994; Pischke and Velling, 1997; Venturini, 
1999). In this paper, we study the effect of immigration on natives’ wages in three European 
countries. In the next section, we extend the Altonji-Card (1991) model from two to three 
production factors, to obtain a richer model for predicting wage effects. We then present 
estimates for The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway and we conclude by 
comparing and assessing the results from these three countries. The countries were selected 
for data availability and for interesting contrasts in their immigrant population, as we spell 
out in the concluding section. 
 
2 A System of Connected Local Labour Markets 
Altonji and Card (1991) analyse the effect of immigration with a partial equilibrium model 
for local labour markets. A local economy is assumed to produce one good that is consumed 
both locally and exported to other cities and to import another good. The quantity Y of the 
local good is produced by a single competitive industry with constant returns to scale using 
labour inputs and other inputs with exogenously fixed prices.  
Extending the two-factor model of Altonji and Card, we consider low, medium and high 
skilled labour as production factors in local labour markets. The technology is characterised 
by constant returns to scale. The total labour force, L, consists of low skilled UL , medium or 
‘centrally’ skilled, CL  and high skilled, HL ; U C HL L L L= + + . The respective proportions of 
low, medium and high skilled labour are , ,  and ,N U N C N HU L L C L L H L L= = =  with 
1N N NU C H+ + = .  
In an initial equilibrium, the skill distribution is given as low skilled, NU , medium skilled NC  
and high skilled workers NH . Suppose that an immigrant flow of size I∆ occurs: a fraction of 
immigrants, IU , is low skilled, IC , is medium skilled and the rest is high skilled workers, 
IH . The proportional changes in wage rates of each labour type must satisfy equality of 
wage-induced demand shifts and supply shifts due to immigration adjusted for skill 
composition and product demand composition:  
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(3) 
where log iw∆ is the log wage change for skill group i, ijη  is the elasticity of labour demand 
for skill group i with respect to the wage of group j, iε  indicates the elasticity of labour 
supply of skill group i and iλ are adjustment coefficients1, 0 1iλ< < , defined as  
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(6) 
Yi is consumption by skill group I, ijη is the Marshall-Hicks labour demand elasticity  
( )Ψ−= ijjij σθη
 
(7)
Where jθ  is the wage bill of group j relative to output value, ijσ  is the partial elasticity of 
substitution2 of skill group i with respect to group j and ψ is the demand elasticity of local 
output to its relative price p (a weighted average of elasticities of local consumers and 
export). The left-hand sides of equations (1)-(3) indicate the effective proportional increase in 
the supply of labour for the respective skill groups as a result of the immigration flow. The 
right-hand side gives the response of skill groups' local excess demand to the changes in the 
wage rates. If immigrants have the same skill composition as natives ( 1,  all ik i= ) and the 
export share Ye is zero, wages are unaffected by immigration, because of constant returns to 
scale. Only immigration with deviant skill composition has wage effects.  
If we reduce the model to homogeneous labour, where immigrant skill composition cannot 
differ from native skill composition, cross demand elasticities ijη  are zero and all output is 
exported ( 1iλ = ), we have the standard comparative result of an isolated labour market  
( )
1log Iw
Lε η
− ∆∆ = −
 
(8)
                                                 
1 They are slightly rewritten from Altonji and Card’s specification to bring out the role of the export share in 
demand. 
2 If there are only two inputs, the partial elasticity of substitution between two inputs ( )σ  is dual to the Hicksian 
partial elasticity of complementarity ( ) ,  1c cσ =  from the duality of production and cost functions. If there are 
more than two inputs, then 1 cσ ≠  (Hamermesh, 1993).  
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The Altonji-Card model generalises this result to heterogeneous labour and general 
equilibrium effects of product demand. To solve this system, write equations (1)-(3) as  
( )Bd N E W= −
 
(9) 
where  
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and W is a column vector with log wage changes log iw∆ .  
We can solve equation (11) as  
*W dγ=
 
(10)
where ( ) 1* N E Bγ −= − .  
The coefficients in γ are determined by underlying parameters. The vector B reflects the 
generalisation from a simple labour market, with the k ratio for skill mix effects and the 'sλ  
for output demand composition effects (B would be a unit vector for immigration not 
affecting the labour skill mix and all output exported). Clearly, relative to Altonji and Card 
we get a richer menu of potential outcomes, as a two-factor model can only allow q-
complements (Hamermesh, 1986, 443). Signs cannot be determined on a priori theoretical 
considerations, but the model can be used to simulate the impact of immigration and its 
dependence on parameter values. For example, suppose 4.=IU , 2.=NU , .45I NC C= = , 
.15IH = , .35NH = , labour supply elasticities are .1iε = , own demand elasticities 
25.=iiσ , H.1, .4 and .2U Cθ θ θ= = = , 2−=Ψ  and 3./ =ΥΥe , substitution elasticities 
.75ij jiσ σ= = . Then, 7.83Uγ = − , 5.34Cγ =  and 4.76Hγ = . However, if we make 
low and high skilled labour complements rather than substitutes ( 75.−== HUUH σσ ), and 
leave all other parameters unchanged, we get 27.11Uγ = , 5.66Cγ =  and 6.17Hγ = − .  
One may survey empirical magnitudes of the parameters and predict likely outcomes, for 
different circumstances in different countries.  In this paper, we will not do that, but rather 
focus on estimating reduced form wage equations (10).    
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3 Estimating Wage Elasticities 
Equation (10) relates changes in wages to the share of new immigrants in the labour force. 
However, since we have only single-year observations, we can only estimate in levels:  
log Iw
L
γ  =   
 
(11)
which is equivalent to  
log Iw
L
γ  ∆ = ∆  
 
(12)
 Using the equality 1I I I
L L L
∆    ∆ = −          (Altonji and Card, 1991), we can write the 
earnings function as 
1log
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(13)
Hence: by estimating (11) (in levels rather than first differences), our estimate of γ  is biased  
upward, roughly by the share of immigrants in the labour force. With generally small shares, 
this bias will be negligible. We estimate wage elasticities by the estimation of earnings 
functions   
ijrkrjkijrjijr uPXw ++= δβlog
 
(14)
ijrw  is earnings of person i belonging to skill group j in area r. ijrX  is a vector of potential 
explanatory variables such as those related to human capital, relevant individual and family 
characteristics, and other control variables for city, industry and job characteristics. u is a 
random error term. krP  is a vector of the share of immigrants from group k in local labour 
market r, i.e. .100x
r
kr
kr L
IP =  The coefficientsδ  are approximations of γ . Structural 
parameters in δ  cannot be identified by the estimation strategy applied here3. A negative sign 
of γ  will be called a substitution relationship (between native workers and immigrants) while 
a positive sign will be called complementarity.  
The estimation of earnings functions by OLS regards all explanatory variables as exogenous, 
and views the concentration of immigrants in local labour markets as unaffected by wages. In 
fact, wage differentials across labour markets can generate an incentive for workers to move. 
If this so-called endogeneity problem is present, OLS will not yield unbiased and consistent 
parameter estimators. One technique, which can solve this problem and other sorts of 
measurement problems, is instrumental variable estimation (IV). Since the coefficient of the 
percentage of immigrants in local labour markets, δ, is of particular interest, we need one or 
                                                 
3 For structural estimates based on production technology, see Zorlu (2002).  
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more variables (instruments) that are highly correlated with the concentration of immigrants, 
P, but uncorrelated with the error term, u, to take into account the endogeneity of immigrant-
concentration. The problem in practice is that such a variable is hard to find. Moreover, the 
existence of endogeneity is not always confirmed by the application of IV. De New and 
Zimmermann (1994) find a clear evidence for endogeneity in the German Household Panel 
Survey (GSOEP) and validity of IV estimations, while Borjas (1986 and 1987) suggests that 
the results are not affected by estimation procedures in the US. The presence of mobility 
costs and imperfect information also suggest that the perfect equalisation of wage 
differentials cannot be realised in the short-run. We take wage-induced regional mobility as 
less relevant in the countries we study, but we have nevertheless attempted IV-estimates with 
the variables available. 
 
4 The Netherlands 
4.1 Immigration history 
Major immigration waves from Indonesia occurred directly after the de-colonisation in 1949-
1951, in 1952-1957 and in the early 1960s. Migration from Indonesia has caused no 
economic problems for migrants with Dutch citizenship (which they possessed in case of two 
Dutch parents, and could choose in case of one). Problematic was the position of Moluccans, 
mostly former soldiers in the Dutch-Indies Army and their families (Veenman, 1990; 
Lucassen and Penninx, 1994: 145). Two large immigration flows occurred after the de-
colonisation of Surinam in 1975 and in 1979-1980 (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997: 42-44). 
Immigration from Surinam and Dutch Antilles has not led to smooth economic integration, 
and these groups are still targets for economic policies. The flow of large numbers of ‘guest 
workers’ started in the 1960s (Hartog and Vriend 1989), in later years became dominated by 
family formation and re-union motives. Additionally, the flow of political refugees and 
asylum seekers has increased.  
Surinamese, Antillians, Turks and Moroccans became the largest ethnic minority groups and 
this group is gradually growing due to a combination of continuous immigration and a 
relatively high birth rate. In 2000, the Netherlands had a total of 2,775,325 residents or 17.5% 
of the total population who were born abroad or who had at least one parent who was born 
abroad.4 About half of these people are originally from the so-called non-western countries. 
The largest group is Turks (308,890), followed by Surinamese (302,515), Moroccans 
(262,220), and Antilleans and Arubans (107,200). The inflow of Mediterranean guest 
workers may well have induced a substantial downward pressure on the unskilled wage 
(Hartog and Vriend 1989). Immigrants from Western countries do not get attention from 
research or policy, at least up to now. More than half of Western immigrants (56.4%) are 
from European countries. People from the southern European countries (89,305) compose 
only 11.6% of total number of people from European countries. According to UNCHR, the 
number of the political refugees was 118,700 in 1999 (Zorlu and Hartog 2002). 
                                                 
4 Since 1992, this definition is applied for the ethnic background of the residents because the identification of an 
immigrant is increasingly undermined by assimilation/integration. Children of first generation immigrants were 
born in the Netherlands or came to the Netherlands at early ages. Moreover, between 1985-1998, 491,000 
people have gained the Dutch nationality. 
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Ethnic minorities from EU-countries are mainly concentrated along Belgian and German 
borders and in the so-called Randstad area where the four largest cities are located, i.e. 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Ethnic minorities from non-EU countries 
are highly concentrated in the same cities and to a lesser degree in old industry regions, 
Brabant and Arnhem. 
Economic research on the effect of immigration on the Dutch economy is mostly limited to 
analysis of the impact of 'guest workers' (Heijke 1979, Hartog and Vriend 1989). Van Beek 
(1993), Kee (1993) and Bovenkerk et al. (1995) provide strong evidence that ethnic 
minorities are at a disadvantage in the Dutch labour market. 
4.2 Reduced form elasticities 
Percentages of ethnic minorities in the local labour market are calculated using administrative 
population statistics.5 The population statistics cover the whole population of the Netherlands 
in 1997 but only five ethnic origins are identifiable: 
1. Western countries (EU, Eastern Europe, Indonesia and other industrialised countries like 
USA, Canada and Japan)  
2. Turkey 
3. Morocco 
4. Surinam 
5. Dutch Antilles (including Aruba)  
Since (un-)employed workers can not be identified from the population statistics, the 
participation rate is assumed to be identically distributed across local labour markets for each 
ethnic minority group. Wage elasticities are estimated using two alternative data sets, GPD 
and LSO.  GPD data have been collected by SEO (Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek), 
University of Amsterdam, from a questionnaire included in 20 local newspapers on Saturday, 
January 17, 1998 that hypothetically came in the hands of 1.7 million households in the 
whole country.6 Unfortunately, Amsterdam is excluded. From population statistics gathered 
by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for 1998, we used the number of residents in 548 
municipalities by ethnicity.  
Estimated earnings functions, with robust standard errors, presented in Appendix Table 
A.4.1, contain no surprises for the usual variables. Wage elasticities7, calculated from the 
coefficients and the means of relevant regressors, are presented in Table 4.1. The presence of 
ethnic minorities from EU countries has a positive effect on low skilled natives and a 
negative effect on high skilled natives. However, none of the coefficients is significant. The 
estimated coefficients clearly show that the concentration of people from non-EU countries 
has a significant negative effect on the wages of low skilled workers and a significant 
positive effect on the wages of high skilled native workers. The coefficient for medium 
skilled workers is not significant. Ethnic minorities from non-EU countries are substitutes for 
low skilled and complements with high skilled native Dutch workers. A 10 percent increase 
of ethnic minorities from non-EU countries decreases the earnings of low skilled workers by 
                                                 
5 These statistics are from administrative registers of the entire population in the Netherlands, specified at 
municipality level and published at the website of CBS.  
6 We are immensely grateful to professor Bernard van Praag for allowing us to use these data. Note that we use 
the survey only for observations on natives. Ethnic minority shares are taken form population statistics. 
7 These are elasticities, not semi-elasticities: relative effects of percentage changes in minority shares. 
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0.42% and increases the earnings of high skilled workers by 0.21%. Medium skilled natives 
are virtually unaffected.   
 
    Table 4.1. Wage elasticities, GPD, 1998 
 The change in the wage of 
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
With respect to share of  
Elasticity t Elasticity t Elasticity t
Eth. minorities from EU  0.013 0.65 0.000 0.02 -0.016 1.37
Eth. minorities from Non-EU  -0.042 2.26 -0.010 0.50 0.021 2.01
t-statistics are related to the underlying coefficients (see Table A.4.1). The elasticities based on the coefficients 
that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold.   
 
The second data set is LSO 1997, the large and representative micro data (N=148948) 
collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), a combination from three sources: the employment 
and wages survey (an employer survey), the administrative data for insured people (VZA) 
and the labour force survey (EBB). Unemployed people and self-employed are not included 
in the data since the employer survey and VZA are taken as base. The LSO data set from 
1997 is the first large representative micro data set including enough observations from 
ethnic minority groups for statistical analyses. Ethnic origin is defined by the birthplace of 
the respondent or by one of the parents’ birthplace. Note that this definition is very broad and 
also covers children of immigrants who were born in the Netherlands. From the data it is 
impossible to identify birthplace, education acquired abroad and proficiency in the Dutch 
language. The sample is divided up as follows (number of observations in brackets) 
1. Native Dutch workers (138,722) 
2. Workers from the European Union countries (2,217) 
3. Workers from Eastern European countries (617) 
4. Workers from non-European countries (Americans excluded) (1,705) 
5. Workers from Turkey (1,205) 
6. Workers from Morocco (703) 
7. Workers from Surinam (1,675) 
8. Workers from Indonesia (1,341) 
9. Workers from Dutch Antilles (including Aruba) (570) 
 
Native Dutch workers are disaggregated by gender and they are divided by three skill 
categories, approximated by education level. Low skill involves primary and extended 
primary education (in Dutch: BO, MAVO and VBO). Medium skill level covers secondary 
(vocational) education (in Dutch: HAVO/VWO and MBO). High skill level is defined as 
higher vocational and university education (HBO and WO). Percentages of ethnic minorities 
in local labour markets are calculated using the population statistics.  
People who are not able to work (N=7513) do not enter the wage equation. Earnings of 
workers is weekly income, calculated by dividing gross monthly earnings plus bonus by 4 
weeks. Seven education levels are given in the data and they are included in earnings 
functions as dummy variables, as controls within skill groups. The lowest education is 
unfinished primary education, and the highest level is university education. Years of 
education is calculated on the basis of these seven education levels to approximate potential 
experience, a subtraction of education years plus 5 from the respondents’ age. Tenure 
indicates the years worked for the current employer. Dummies are created for 5 occupation 
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levels, for the four largest cities where immigrants are concentrated as well as for married and 
public sector. Full-time and part-time employment contracts are also defined, as dummy 
variables, while flexible jobs are the base category. Also 6 dummies are generated for having 
one or more children aged between 0-5, 6-11 and 12-17 years.  
All sub-samples are estimated separately by OLS and instrumental variable (IV) methods. To 
take into account the effect of social networks influencing the settlement behaviour of ethnic 
minorities in cities, percentages of EU-people, Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and other non-
Dutch people in municipalities in 1990 are used as instruments.8 To capture factors that 
would attract ethnic minorities to certain local labour markets, aggregated wage levels, 
investment levels in housing, in COROP9 areas are included. Additionally, it is well known 
that ethnic minorities are more often employed in industry (especially Turks and Moroccans), 
service sector (EU) and in the public sector (workers from the former colonies). These effects 
are approximated by the percentage of industry and service sectors in the total wage bill and 
the percentage of government services in value-added. The Hausman test is applied to 
estimations of each sub-sample to determine whether there is sufficient difference between 
the coefficients of IV and OLS regressions. If the null hypothesis that differences in 
coefficients are not systematic, is rejected, the outcomes of the IV estimator are reported in 
our elasticity tables; otherwise, the outcomes of the OLS estimator are reported (in these 
cases, an asterisk is attached to the elasticities in Table 4.2). The estimated coefficients for 
the sub-samples are presented in Appendix Tables A4.2-A4.8. Note that the native Dutch 
sample is broken down first by skill levels and alternatively by gender. Although IV 
estimators are generally preferred to OLS estimators in Table 4.2, the estimation strategies 
provide similar results, concerning sign and significance level of coefficients. This suggests 
that the endogeneity problem is not very prominent.  
Immigrants from Western countries, mostly high skilled workers in internationally oriented 
firms, have a small negative effect on the wages of low skilled (-.042) and on male native 
Dutch workers (-.013) when the gender decomposition is considered. The former effect is 
remarkable because these immigrants might be expected to compete especially with high 
skilled Dutch workers. Note that the aggregation of non-western immigrants has some effect 
on the estimated effect for western immigrants. 
The impact of Turks and Moroccans on the native Dutch workers is different although both 
belong to the lowest skilled ethnic groups. Turks have a very small adverse effect on the 
wages of low (-.025) and medium skilled natives (-.018) when native labour force is 
disaggregated by skill, and on the wages of Dutch women (-.015) and men (-.021) when the 
native labour force is broken down by gender. Moroccans have a small positive effect on the 
wages of medium skilled natives (.012), and on the wages of native male workers (.014) 
when native labour force is divided into gender categories. The different effects of Turks and 
Moroccans may be explained by their concentration in sectors and geographical areas. 
                                                 
8 There is still a substantial disagreement about the conceptual framework to study the impact of immigration. 
Borjas (1999) argues that the impact of immigration is hard to detect by correlating native wages and the 
immigrant concentration in local labour markets because possible reactions of native workers and employers on 
increasing immigration in local labour markets lead to the diffusion of the impact of immigration to the whole 
economy. Card (2001) shows that the inter-city mobility of natives in the US is unrelated to immigrant inflows. 
Pischke and Velling (1997) also find no support for the argument that the impact of immigration is eliminated 
by a response of natives in Germany. 
9 In the Netherlands, about 574 municipalities and 40 (or 43) COROP-areas are defined. Aggregated data for 
COROP regions are available from Statistics Netherlands. COROP areas are defined as economically integrated 
areas.  
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Turkish people are more often employed in manufacturing, and they are much more spread 
out over the Netherlands, to areas with a high density of industry-dominated employment.10 
On the other hand, Moroccans are highly concentrated in large cities and are employed more 
often in the service sector, compared to Turks. This may explain the positive effects on all 
wages for the presence of Moroccans (even though big-city dummies are included). 
Moreover, the self-employment rate is higher for Turks than Moroccans. With self-
employment as a more viable option for Turks, those who remain as employee are stronger 
competitors for the Dutch, which might explain their negative effect on native wages. The 
effect may be reinforced by the image of these groups in the public opinion and particularly 
for employers. Moroccans suffer from a poorer image than Turks which may lead to a 
situation in which Moroccans are allowed access only to complementary jobs but are not 
allowed to compete with native Dutch. In other words, they may be refused entry to many 
jobs while Turks may have similar jobs as natives and influence the wages. These arguments 
as explanations for the estimated reduced form effects cannot be verified, however, for lack 
of data. 
Immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles are supposed to be closer substitutes for 
native Dutch workers because they often speak the Dutch language and (have) shared, to 
some extent, a common history with Dutch people. That means we may expect that this 
immigrant group would have an adverse effect on the wages of natives. However, it is the 
other way around: Surinamese have a relatively large positive impact on the wages of high 
skilled natives (.12) and of native males (.075) when the gender disaggregation is applied. 
Finally, the percentage of Antilleans has a positive effect on the wages of medium skilled 
(.054) and native women (.07) when native labour force is divided into gender categories. 
Their high concentration in prosperous Amsterdam cannot explain this effect, as we control 
for it.   
Table 4.2. Wage elasticities LSO 1997 data, The Netherlands: natives.  
Change in the wage of With respect to 
share of Low skilled 
Dutch 
Med-skilled 
Dutch 
High-skilled 
Dutch Dutch women Dutch men 
 Elastic. t Elastic. t Elastic t Elastic. t Elastic. t
Western -0.042 -2.76 -0.008 -1.18 0.001 0.14 0.001 0.11 -0.013 -2.05
Turks -0.025 -4.18 -0.018 -5.99 -0.009 -1.39 -0.015 -3.83 -0.021 -6.52
Moroccans 0.018 1.64 0.012 2.27 0.009 1.10 0.012 1.77 0.014 2.56
Surinamese 0.006 0.16 -0.002 -0.10 0.120 3.95 -0.029 -1.25 0.075 3.62
Antilleans 0.018 0.44 0.054 2.51 -0.027 -0.79 0.070 2.70 0.001 0.06
Aggregate A   
Western  -0.030 -2.27 0.010* 1.75 0.020 2.25 0.016 1.91 0.007 1.38
Non-Western -0.007 -0.58 0.017* 3.06 0.028 2.78 0.020 2.61 0.014 2.44
Aggregate B   
All ethnic 
minorities -0.036 -2.36 0.031* 4.89 0.058 4.95 0.039 4.13 0.028 4.42
Elasticities for the top panel based on regression reported in Appendix Table A 4.2. t-values relate to underlying 
coefficients. Regression coefficients, from which the elasticities in Aggregates A and B are obtained, are not 
presented since the other coefficients included are not changed. * These elasticities are based on the underlying 
coefficients of earnings functions estimated by OLS; the elasticities obtained by IV estimations are very similar. 
The elasticities based on the coefficients that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold.  
                                                 
10 We could not control for industry however, as it is not available in our data set. 
  11
If we pool all immigrants from non-western countries, the effect of these immigrants on the 
native groups is small and positive, except on low skilled natives. This confirms the wage 
elasticity of high skilled Dutch workers with respect to ethnic minorities from non-EU 
countries obtained from GPD data (see Table 4.1). However, the opposite effect of the share 
of non-EU immigrants on low skilled Dutch workers (in Table 4.1) seems to be contradictory 
to the results obtained from LSO data. This may be related to the nature of the data used. 
GPD data do not include the Amsterdam area with many ethnic minorities. Moreover, GPD 
data have self-reported earnings, while LSO has earnings from company records, with 
presumably smaller measurement errors in earnings. When all immigrants are aggregated into 
a single category, the effect of immigrants on low skilled is negative and positive for other 
categories, a conventional result. Hence, comparing GPD and LSO, the complementarity of 
non-Western immigrants to high skilled Dutch is confirmed, but the substitutability to low 
skilled is weakened to statistical insignificance.   
Considering the results in Table 4.3, the wage elasticities of ethnic minority groups with 
respect to minority shares in local labour markets are often not statistically significant. 
Immigrants from Western countries have a large positive effect on the wages of Eastern-
Europeans (.196), Moroccans (.10) and Antilleans (.193). Turks compete with Indonesians (-
.066), while the wages of Surinamese are adversely affected by Moroccans (-.139) but 
positively affected by Antilleans (.162). Surinamese and Turks have a negative own-wage 
elasticity, (-.064) and (-.31).  
We verified the robustness of elasticities in a couple of ways (results are in Appendix 
Tables). Firstly, effects on each skill category of native Dutch labour are estimated for men 
and women separately (Table A.4.4). The differences between men and women are minor, 
and some similarities are striking. Only the effect of Surinamese on Dutch medium skilled 
men and women differs dramatically. 
 
Table 4.3. Wage elasticities LSO 1997 data, The Netherlands (based on OLS estimations): 
immigrants.  
Change in the wage of With respect 
to share of EU East-European non-European Turks 
 Elasticity t Elasticity t Elasticity t Elasticity T
Western -0.063 -0.24 0.196 2.65 -0.026 -0.05 -0.042 -0.92
Turks -0.030 -1.42 -0.046 -1.22 -0.039 -1.42 -0.064 -2.65
Moroccans 0.000 0.00 -0.053 -0.70 0.020 0.40 -0.028 -0.69
Surinamese -0.060 -1.06 -0.165 -1.65 0.024 0.04 -0.089 -1.17
Antilleans 0.061 0.80 0.119 1.77 0.033 0.67 0.098 1.62
 Moroccans Surinamese Indonesians Antilleans
 Elasticity t Elasticity t Elasticity t Elasticity t
Western 0.108 1.84 0.068 1.18 0.041 0.94 0.193 2.46
Turks 0.014 0.04 -0.039 -1.35 -0.066 -2.28 -0.005 -0.08
Moroccans 0.011 0.24 -0.139 -2.59 -0.015 -0.03 0.066 0.90
Surinamese 0.029 0.39 -0.310 -2.60 0.111 1.42 -0.077 0.56
Antilleans -0.013 -0.21 0.162 2.80 -0.020 -0.41 -0.095 -1.07
Wage elasticities are calculated using the estimated coefficients and their mean (elasticity = coefficient x mean). 
Coefficients are obtained by the estimation of earnings functions for all sub-samples separately using OLS. 
Testing indicates that IV estimates are not superior. t are t-values of the estimated coefficients. Earnings 
functions include also individual socio-economic characteristics based on earnings functions in Table A.4.6.  
The elasticities based on the coefficients that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold. 
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Alternatively, the share of foreign-born people (first-generation11) in place of ethnic minority 
shares (including second and third generations and mixed people) is included in regressions. 
The wage elasticities are very similar to those reported in Table 4.2. Additionally, we define 
COROP-regions as local labour markets in place of municipalities. The effect of alternative 
demarcations of the labour market is quite modest. However, differentiation by gender is 
more sensitive to the labour market demarcation. 
In conclusion, we note that the effect of ethnic minorities on the wages of native Dutch 
workers is very small, with wage elasticities up to .12. However, the effect on the wages of 
ethnic minorities is relatively large (up to .31), suggesting that both substitution and 
complementarity among ethnic minorities is stronger than between Dutch and ethnic 
minorities. This outcome confirms research done in the US (Borjas 1999). 
 
5 United Kingdom12 
5.1 Immigration history 
Unlike other West European countries, the United Kingdom has directly recruited only a 
small minority of immigrants. Immigration policies have been designed to restrict 
immigration flows from former British colonies and dominions, although they have not 
always been successful in reaching their objectives. Immigration from Caribbean countries 
and South Asia has increased considerably. Later immigration of non-White people has 
continued in the form of family reunification. Additionally, a large number of professional 
workers, who typically did not settle permanently, have been allowed entry, and the 
immigration of low skilled workers from Southern Europe increased after free mobility of 
persons within the European Community was allowed (Wheatley Price 2001). In 1991 the 
total stock of non-British people numbered nearly 4 million which made up 7.4% of the UK 
population. Nearly 3 million of them belong to an ethnic minority (5.5 % of the total 
population) of whom the majority was born outside the UK (Shields and Wheatley Price 
1999).  
Although Irish immigrants have formed the largest non-British group in the UK (Wheatley 
Price 2001), both immigration policy and research have been concerned in particular with 
non-White immigrants and their descendants. This cannot be fully explained from their 
disadvantaged labour market position. Chinese and Indian people, for example, do very well 
but they nonetheless get attention. Hatton and Wheatley Price (1998) state that UK 
immigration policies have been driven by political concerns about domestic racial relations, 
rather than economic considerations. 
Previous research on immigrants in the UK has focussed mainly on the explanation of the 
disadvantaged position in earnings and (un-)employment prospects.13 Blackaby et al. (1997) 
conclude that UK born non-White ethnic minorities are not doing badly. Blackaby et al. 
(1999) conclude that the high unemployment rate among Pakistani relative to Indians is due 
                                                 
11 First-generation immigrants can be are identified only in the population statistics, not in LSO 1997 data. 
12 Comments from Richard Berkhout, Stephen Drinkwater, Stephen Wheatly Price and participants in the 
Monday afternoon seminar at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
13 Hatton and Wheatley Price (1998) give a detailed survey of immigration policy and previous studies.  
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to less favourable characteristics. Wheatley Price (2001) finds that the low initial 
employment levels for recent male immigrants increase rapidly for White immigrants while 
the employment rate of non-White immigrants never attains the employment level of native 
born men; Hatton and Wheatley Price (1998) confirm this. 
Bell (1997) finds a relatively disadvantaged earnings profile for blacks, which is reduced as 
duration of stay in UK increases. Human capital obtained abroad appreciates less than the 
human capital obtained in the UK although this strongly varies per country. Shields and 
Wheatley Price (1998) report a low return to schooling obtained in the UK for most 
immigrant groups, excepting UK born non-Whites and White immigrants provided English is 
their first language. Shields and Wheatley Price (1999) find, not surprisingly, that fluency in 
English considerably improves the labour market performance of immigrants.  
Clark and Drinkwater (1999) argue that the poor economic performances of ethnic minorities 
are related to their concentration in certain urban areas. Living in ethnic enclaves adversely 
affects human capital accumulation like obtaining English proficiency (Shields and Wheatley 
Price 1999). No research has been conducted to study the impact of immigration on the 
labour market.  
5.2 The Data 
Four waves of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS), Spring 1997, Summer 1997, 
Autumn 1997, and Winter 1998, are pooled for this study because separate waves do not 
provide sufficient observations. Each respondent is allowed to enter once in the data analysed 
here. Among all respondents, the population aged 16-64 is used for the descriptive analysis. 
Only employees are selected for further estimations. People who are self-employed, working 
on a government training programme and doing unpaid family work, are excluded from the 
survey. Employees are divided into five main categories: Black, Indian, 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Mixed/Other origins are selected using the definition used in the 
Census of Population14 and then the rest of population is defined as White. From here 
onwards, the sample of Pakistani/Bangladeshi is shortly called Pakistani and the sample of 
Mixed/Other is called Mixed. The samples of ethnic minority groups cover both British- and 
foreign-born persons.  
On average, the ethnic minority population, especially Pakistani, is younger than the White 
population. Minorities (except Indian men) are less frequently employed. The unemployment 
rate among Black and Pakistani is, on average, the highest. The unemployment gap between 
White and other ethnic groups is considerably larger for men than for women, except Black 
women. A relatively large share of Indian people is self-employed. The average weekly 
earnings of the employed labour force vary widely among the five samples. Indian employees 
earn the highest net wages in a week (about £231, but with a large standard deviation), 
followed by Mixed (£212), White (£206), Black (£193) and Pakistani (£154). The same 
ranking can be observed in the number of mean working-hours.. Indian workers possess, on 
average, the highest skill levels, followed by Mixed, Black, White and Pakistani; almost 
three-quarters of Pakistani workers are low skilled. Temporary jobs are more popular for 
ethnic minorities than for Whites. Indian and Pakistani workers are more often employed in 
                                                 
14 Ethnic origin is based on the respondents own assessment, rather than birth place of respondents or their 
parents (ETHNICA in the Labour Force Survey). Black is a pool of Caribbean, African and Mixed Black 
workers. Indian covers workers from India. Pakistani is a pool of Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers. Mixed is a 
pool of Chinese, Asian (non-mixed), other Non-mixed and other Mixed workers. 
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the public sector than other ethnic minorities or Whites. A relatively large proportion of 
Indian and Mixed is non-manual workers and professionals.  
Black people live in the West Midlands, Inner and Outer London. Indian people are 
concentrated mainly in the East Midlands, West Midland and Outer London. Pakistani people 
are concentrated in Greater Manchester, West York, the West Midlands, Inner and Outer 
London. People from category Mixed are concentrated around London and the South East. In 
addition, the differences in employment by industries among the samples are notable: ethnic 
minorities are concentrated in manufacturing, the wholesale industries, hotels, transport, real 
estate and health.  
5.3 Reduced form elasticities 
As before, we prefer to choose local labour markets, i.e. 66 counties, rather than industries, as 
the unit of observation, assuming labour is less mobile across regions than across industries. 
Ethnic minorities are more concentrated in certain regions than in certain industries. Indeed, 
our experimentations with earnings effects from immigrant shares in industries indicate that 
labour market competition between ethnic minorities and White labour, if at all present, may 
occur within counties rather than within industries. The entire labour force is disaggregated 
alternatively into 6 and 7 categories of workers, which are approximated by their education 
level and ethnic background. The sample of White workers, is assumed to be equivalent to 
native British since White immigrants and native British people have similar characteristics. 
White employees are divided into three skill levels using their highest education level: low, 
medium and high skilled workers.  
In the estimated earnings, explanatory variables of a Mincer type earnings function are 
included. Experience is defined as age minus the age when the full-time education is 
presumably finished. Tenure is the years that the individual has worked for his or her current 
employer. Working hours refers to total actual hours worked in the main and second job. We 
include dummies for industries and regions where ethnic minority workers are concentrated 
and for working in a firm with less than 20 employees. Further, dummy variables are used to 
control for differences in gender, marital status, type of job, having health problems, union 
membership, commuting and public/private sector. Additionally, for the earnings equations 
of ethnic minorities, we construct dummy variables to capture cohort effects, distinguishing 
five periods when immigrants arrived: between 1940-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-
1990 and after 1990. Dummies are also included for the separate quarterly waves of the 
survey. The results of the estimated earning functions with robust standard errors are 
presented in Table A5.1 and Table A5.2 in Appendix. They show conventional results, and 
also indicate that years since migration (i.e. cohort effects) have a slight tendency to improve 
earnings, although the effect is statistically very weak. 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated wage elasticities for White workers with respect to the 
percentage of ethnic minority workers in the counties.15 The results are rather unambiguous, 
with most coefficients statistically significant (15 out of 24). The estimations show that Black 
and Pakistani workers have in general a negative effect on the wages of Whites from the three 
skill categories while the percentage Indian and Mixed has a positive effect on the wages of 
the three skill categories. Blacks are not visibly different in education and other skill 
indicators and they are substitutes to all native categories. 
                                                 
15 Obviously, the potential bias from endogeneity of immigrant shares in local labour markets is here also 
present, but we have no variables available to attempt IV estimation. 
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Table 5.1. Wage elasticities for Whites 
Change in the wage of
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
With respect 
to share of 
Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. T Elast. t Elast. t
Black  -0.020 -2.31 -0.026 -2.04 0.015 1.10 -0.054 -4.90 -0.031 -1.75 -0.024 -1.69
Indian 0.014 1.98 0.014 1.54 0.019 2.22 0.000 0.01 0.011 0.66 0.056 4.14
Pakistani -0.032 -4.88 -0.019 -3.81 -0.026 -3.17 -0.020 -3.64 -0.005 -0.56 -0.016 -2.48
Mixed 0.032 4.24 0.041 3.87 0.017 1.46 0.043 4.56 0.017 1.16 0.029 3.04
t-statistics are on the estimated coefficients in Table A 5.1 in Appendix. The elasticities based on the 
coefficients that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold. 
 
Pakistani are typically low skilled and low tenured, and they are also substitutes to all native 
categories. Indians and Mixed are complementary to all native categories. They are quite 
similar to each other in skill distribution (bi-polar relative to natives) but rather different in 
regional, occupational and industry concentration. If we pool the subsamples of Blacks and 
Pakistani (called BPB) and the subsamples of Indian and Mixed (called IM), the estimations 
(not reproduced here) show that the wage elasticities of low, medium, and high skilled 
Whites (not distinguished by gender) with respect to the percentages of BPB are -.04, -.03 
and -.03 (coefficients are -.016, -.018 and -.015), implying a substitution relationship between 
BPB and White workers. On the other hand, the wage elasticities of low, medium, and high 
skilled Whites with respect to IM are .03, .02 and .04 (the coefficients are .011, .008 and 
.017), implying a complementarity relationship between IM and White workers. All these 
coefficients are statistically significant. The uniform effect on the native skill groups is 
remarkable. The outcomes clearly point to a substitution relationship between the low skilled 
BPB and Whites and a complementarity relationship between the high skilled IM and Whites.  
In Table 5.2, the estimations of earnings functions of ethnic minorities show the labour 
market competition among ethnic minorities.  Indian workers have a significant positive 
effect on the wages of Pakistani workers. The other coefficients underlying the elasticities are 
not significant. Apparently, immigrant shares have no effect on other immigrants’ wages. 
Perhaps this is related to their regional segregation: they have different concentration areas. 
 
Table 5.2. Wage elasticities for ethnic minorities 
Change in the wage of  
BLACK INDIAN PAKISTANI MIXED 
With respect to quantity 
of Coeff. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Percentage Black -0.213 -0.74 -0.201 -0.64 0.077 0.30 0.162 0.40 
Percentage Indian  0.090 0.45 -0.174 -0.38 0.875 2.66 0.366 0.88 
Percentage Pakistani  0.029 0.29 -0.141 -0.67 0.488 1.16 0.352 0.87 
Percentage Mixed  -0.029 -0.11 0.041 0.09 0.619 0.63 
   
t-statistics are on the estimated coefficients in Table A5.2 in Appendix. The elasticities based on the coefficients 
that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold. 
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From these estimates we conclude that in the UK the share of Black and Pakistani has a 
significant negative effect on the wages of Whites while the share of Indian and Mixed has a 
positive effect on the wages of Whites. The cross-elasticities among different ethnic minority 
groups show that Black workers are substitutes for the Mixed. Indian workers are substitute 
for Pakistani and they seem to be complementary to Mixed workers.  
 
6 Norway 
6.1 Immigration history 
Until 1970, immigrants in Norway are mainly from other Nordic countries and  industrialised 
countries like the UK and the US, and overwhelmingly employed in the growing oil and gas 
sector. Additionally, immigrants came from developing countries, especially Pakistan, India, 
Turkey and Morocco, finding employment in unskilled manual jobs. The Norwegian 
government passed a restrictive immigration law in 1974, although still admitting immigrants 
with specific skills. The number of immigrants has increased due to family (re-)unification 
and inflow of asylum seekers,  initially from Chile and Vietnam, and since 1975 from Iran, 
Sri Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.  
In 2000, 282 500 immigrants live in Norway which is 6.3 percent of the total population.16 
About 84 per cent of the immigrant population are counted as the first generation. The share 
of immigration from Nordic countries has decreased over time, from 44.8% in 1970 to 18.9% 
in 2000. The share of immigrants from Western Europe and North-America/Oceania 
decreased from 25.7% in 1970 to 11.7% in 2000, and from 13.7% to 3.4% respectively. On 
the other hand, in the same period, the share of immigrants from developing countries and 
from Eastern Europe increased from 6% to 49.7%, and from 9.8% to 16.3%.  
Existing studies indicate that especially immigrants from non-OECD countries have a 
disadvantaged labour market position (Larsen et al. (2000); Hayfron (1998); Longva and 
Raaum (2000)). Earnings of immigrants from OECD-countries are comparable to the 
earnings of natives at the time of entry and remain at the same level (Longva and Raaum, 
(2000); Barth et al. (2001)) report that immigrant earnings are more sensitive to local 
unemployment than the earnings of natives. No research has been conducted on the impact of 
immigrants on the labour market outcomes of native Norwegian labour workers. 
6.2 Data 
The data used are from two cross-sections from the Norwegian individual administrative 
data, KIRUT, which is a 10 percent sample of the Norwegian population between 16 and 66 
years old. The first wave is the starting point of this data collection, in 1989 and the second 
cross-section is the latest measurement point, 1996. Each wave contains a random sample of 
Norwegian and all non-Norwegian citizens in the KIRUT database.  
We use weekly earnings derived from the yearly income of wage earners, i.e. yearly income 
is divided by 52. Yearly income covers all kind of income sources, like sickness payment, 
unemployment benefit, own-business etc.  It is hard to identify the exact wage income. 
                                                 
16 According to the Norwegian definition, the immigrant population consists of first and second-generation 
immigrants. First generation immigrants refer to foreign-born persons with two foreign-born parents, and 
second generation immigrants are Norwegian-born persons with two foreign-born parents. 
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Working hours are given as a categorical variable, covering three intervals 1) 4 to 19 hours, 
2) 20 to 29 hours and 3) 30 hours and more. 
Relative to Norwegians, one observes a low average age and lower income level of workers 
from Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, and a slightly higher age and higher income 
level of workers from Nordic countries and EU countries. Immigrants from Nordic countries 
are the most similar to Norwegians. They are more likely employed in immigrant sectors like 
Hotels, Education and Health. Female immigrants from Nordic countries are higher educated 
than Norwegians. Immigrants from EU-countries have a higher education level (the 
percentage of high-educated people is double that in the Norwegian sample) and they are 
more frequently employed in Financial Services, Education, Health, Hotels and Mining. 
Immigrants from Eastern European countries differ strongly by gender category. A vast 
majority of Eastern European men is low educated (70%) while Eastern European women are 
concentrated at the top and bottom of education levels. In contrast, women from the rest of 
the world are lower educated than men from the same category. A relatively large percentage 
of workers from Eastern Europe and the rest of the world is employed in part-time jobs, and 
in the public sector. A high concentration of immigrants from the last category, both women 
and men, in the Hotel sector is also notable.  
A major portion of immigrants is located in Southern Norway, especially concentrated in 
Oslo. Half of the immigrants from the category World and a quarter of other immigrant 
groups are residing in Oslo. The shares of immigrants in the counties are generally quite low, 
no doubt straining the estimation procedure. 
6.3 Reduced form elasticities 
Having cross-section data from 1989 and 1996 allows us to estimate wage elasticities in these 
two years. Percentages of immigrants in 19 counties17 are calculated using KIRUT data. 
Experience is defined as age minus schooling years minus 6. Years of education are given by 
6 through 20 years, for which 15 education dummies are defined. Additionally, dummies are 
constructed to control for marital status and for 12 industrial sectors and a dummy for Oslo 
where immigrants are highly concentrated. Low skill is defined as education level up to 10 
years, medium skill refers to 11 through 15 years, high skill to 16 through 20 years of 
education. Within each sample, the earnings equation also includes the dummies for each of 
the actual years of education. 
Earnings functions are estimated separately for the five and six groups of Norwegian 
workers: three skill categories and two gender categories (5 sub-samples), and alternatively 
three skill categories by gender (6 sub-samples) to trace the effect of immigration on 
aggregate skill and gender categories. These earnings functions are also estimated for four 
groups of immigrant workers (Nordic, EU, Eastern Europe and the rest of the world).18 The 
                                                 
17 Counties are assumed to be local labour markets. Alternatively, we estimated earnings function defining 54 
police districts or 422 municipalities as local labour markets. However, the percentages of immigrant groups in 
smaller geographical locations are very low and generate quite unstable estimations. Also we estimated earnings 
functions including the percentages of immigrant groups in industries which generate less sharp wage 
elasticities. Therefore, these are not presented here.    
18 All earnings equations are also estimated by IV estimations, instrumenting immigrant shares in 1996 by the 
immigrant percentages in 1989, to control for a possible self-selectivity of immigrants to move to high income 
regions. However, the Hausman test for model specification rejects IV estimations, and thus OLS estimations 
are preferred and consequently, the elasticities presented are based on OLS estimations. 
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coefficients of the earnings functions, with conventional results, are presented in Appendix 
Tables A6.1 to A6.4. 
In Table 6.1, Panel A presents the wage elasticities with respect to four immigrant groups. 
Panel B presents the wage elasticities with respect to aggregate immigrant groups.19 
Immigrants from Nordic and EU countries are mostly labour migrants, with labour market 
characteristics comparable with Norwegians. Furthermore, they are mobile both ways 
between Norway and their home country. The second group of immigrants (non-Nordic and 
non-EU) are dominated by early ‘guest’ workers, their family members and political 
refugees. These groups have a relative low skill level and the probability of re-migration is 
often low because it would be hard to leave their home country again.  
When all immigrants are pooled, the impact of immigrants is positive on the wages of low 
and medium skilled; the elasticities decrease between 1989 and 1996, i.e. from .07 to .025 for 
low skilled and from .092 to .02 for medium skilled. These two effects return in the effect for 
Norwegian males and females, also positive and decreasing, from .092 to .015 for males and 
from .05 to .024 for females (Panel B, Table 6.1). The positive impact of immigrants from 
EU countries is a consistent contributor to these results; however, Nordic immigrants, 
comparable in skill levels, often have a negative effect on natives’ wages. The pooled 
immigrants seem to have no impact on the high skilled Norwegian workers, neither in 1989 
nor in 1996. This results from aggregating many weak and some strong opposing effects. 
Further decomposition, simultaneously by gender and skill (Table 6.2), shows that low 
skilled men are not affected by immigration while for medium and high skilled women the 
effect is restricted to a positive effect of Nordic women (for medium skilled) and of East 
European women (for high skilled), both only in 1996. Medium skilled men are substitutes 
with Nordic immigrants and complements with immigrants from EU and Rest. Many effects 
are not robust over time. The instability might serve to undermine confidence in the findings. 
However, the period from 1989 to 1996 has been characterised by a relatively large inflow of 
political refugees from Eastern European and some other developing countries. Indeed, the 
elasticities for immigrants from East Europe and Rest of the World mostly increase in 
absolute magnitude between 1989 and 1996. In 1996, Norwegian wages are affected 
negatively for low and medium skilled and positively for high skilled. But only two of these 
effects are statistically significant. Such a pattern is less clear for immigrants from Rest of the 
World, among whom especially men are lower educated than the men from East Europe. 
Table 6.3 displays wage elasticities of immigrant groups (on the basis of the estimated 
coefficients in Table A6.2 and A 6.4).  Only the wage elasticity of Nordic and EU-
immigrants appears to be significant at 5% level with respect to the share of immigrants from 
Nordic and World in 1989 (.26 and .76). Since the number of observation for immigrants, in 
particular for immigrants from Eastern Europe, is very small, it should be no surprise that 
estimations of immigrant earnings functions produce rather unreliable coefficients. Moreover, 
most immigrants from Eastern Europe and ‘World’ came quite recently to Norway and they 
are extremely concentrated in a couple of industries and regions. Still, as in other countries, 
the absolute magnitude of elasticities for immigrant wages on average is larger than for native 
wages.  
 
 
                                                 
19 These elasticities are obtained by separate estimations of earnings functions including two immigrant groups 
and in another case all immigrants. 
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Table 6.1. Wage elasticities of Norwegian workers by skill level and gender, KIRUT 
 PANEL A PANEL B 
CHANGE IN THE WAGE OF CHANGE IN THE WAGE OF 
1989 1996 1989 1996 With respect to share of 
Elasti. t-stat Elast. t-stat
With respect to 
share of 
Elast. t-stat Elast. t-stat
Low skilled Low skilled 
Nordic -0.050 -2.45 0.047 1.92 Nordic/EU 0.022 1.09 0.112 3.70
EU 0.040 3.22 0.048 1.76 EastEuro/World 0.061 1.93 -0.059 -1.16
East-Europe 0.003 0.18 -0.094 -2.68    
World 0.063 1.57 0.029 0.59 All immigrants 0.070 3.48 0.025 5.68
Medium skilled Medium skilled 
Nordic -0.010 -0.62 -0.009 -0.48 Nordic/EU 0.057 3.43 0.003 0.13
EU 0.047 4.52 0.003 0.17 EastEuro/World 0.027 0.83 0.094 2.20
East-Europe 0.002 0.14 -0.035 -1.28    
World 0.028 0.72 0.119 3.22 All immigrants 0.092 5.03 0.020 5.75
High skilled High skilled 
Nordic -0.110 -2.65 -0.026 -0.64 Nordic/EU -0.141 -3.47 -0.065 -1.40
EU -0.048 -1.83 -0.010 -0.25 EastEuro/World 0.183 2.28 -0.019 -0.23
East-Europe 0.055 1.14 0.112 2.35    
World 0.104 1.03 -0.155 -1.59 All immigrants -0.088 -1.63 -0.013 -0.94
Women Women 
Nordic -0.025 -1.22 0.047 2.16 Nordic/EU 0.023 1.12 0.079 2.88
EU 0.027 2.14 0.022 0.91 EastEuro/World 0.032 0.89 -0.062 -1.31
East-Europe -0.012 -0.72 -0.060 -1.98    
World 0.065 1.46 0.007 0.16 All immigrants 0.050 2.45 0.024 6.44
Men Men 
Nordic -0.038 -2.35 -0.018 -1.02 Nordic/EU 0.036 2.27 -0.001 -0.05
EU 0.045 4.84 0.009 0.46 EastEuro/World 0.070 2.55 0.125 3.03
East-Europe 0.017 1.11 -0.023 -0.86    
World 0.044 1.32 0.132 3.57 All immigrants 0.092 5.35 0.015 4.17
t-statistics are on the underlying coefficients reported in the Appendix. EU refers to immigrants from EU-
countries. East EUR refers to immigrants from Eastern Europe and World is the rest of the world. The 
elasticities based on the coefficients that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold. 
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Table 6.2. Wage elasticities of Norwegian workers by skill and gender, KIRUT 
CHANGE IN THE WAGE OF 
MEN WOMEN 
1989 1996 1989 1996 
With respect to 
share of 
Elasticity t-stat Elasticity t-stat Elasticity t-stat Elasticity t-stat
Low skilled   
Nordic -0.013 -0.49 0.057 1.84 -0.074 -2.42 0.039 1.07
EU 0.027 1.70 0.033 0.87 0.052 2.76 0.057 1.47
East-Europe 0.007 0.32 -0.063 -1.38 -0.005 -0.22 -0.125 -2.42
World 0.096 1.76 0.035 0.52 0.015 0.26 0.022 0.31
Medium skilled   
Nordic -0.029 -1.41 -0.063 -2.71 0.022 0.81 0.072 2.52
EU 0.080 6.61 0.012 0.48 -0.001 -0.03 -0.012 -0.39
East-Europe 0.009 0.36 -0.020 -0.52 -0.009 -0.36 -0.049 -1.25
World 0.000 -0.01 0.180 3.97 0.063 0.90 0.042 0.69
High skilled   
Nordic -0.208 -3.36 -0.017 -0.31 0.067 1.31 -0.061 -0.93
EU -0.060 -2.29 -0.083 -1.72 -0.009 -0.18 0.027 0.36
East-Europe 0.131 3.05 0.057 0.99 -0.065 -0.59 0.205 2.39
World -0.005 -0.04 0.105 0.94 0.164 0.85 -0.330 -1.82
t-statistics are on the estimated coefficients in Appendix tables. EU refers to immigrants from EU-countries. 
East EUR refers to immigrants from Eastern Europe and World is the rest of the world. The elasticities based on 
the coefficients that are significant at least at 5% level, are given in bold. 
 
Table 6.3. Wage elasticities of immigrants, KIRUT 
CHANGE IN THE WAGE OF 
1989 1996 1989 1996 
With respect to 
quantity of 
Elastic t-stat Elastic t-stat Elastic t-stat Elastic. t-stat
Nordic East-Eur 
Nordic 0.261 2.33 0.113 1.86 Nordic -0.296 -0.47 -0.005 -0.01
EU -0.025 -0.30 -0.056 -0.95 EU 0.246 0.57 -0.160 -0.69
East-Europe 0.064 0.66 0.112 1.23 East-Europe 0.843 1.25 -0.084 -0.29
World 0.303 0.88 0.093 0.61 World -1.295 -0.63 1.021 1.56
EU World 
Nordic 0.262 2.06 0.089 1.19 Nordic 0.160 0.79 0.199 1.22
EU -0.037 -0.30 0.125 1.68 EU -0.293 -1.76 -0.253 -1.05
East-Europe 0.018 0.14 -0.033 -0.34 East-Europe -0.215 -0.76 -0.277 -1.15
World 0.763 2.06 -0.039 -0.18 World 0.723 1.13 -0.039 -0.05
Based on Tables A6.2 and A.6.4 Appendix. The elasticities based on the coefficients that are significant at least 
at 5% level, are given in bold. 
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7  Assessment 
Estimation of the wage elasticities in three countries naturally calls for a comparison of 
results. But we should then not forget the limitations of the data. First, as immigrants could, 
at best, only be differentiated by ethnic origin, and not by skill, we could only use the average 
human capital of immigrants in predicting or interpreting wage effects on natives. 
Heterogeneity within groups may differ between countries. Second, the definitions of an 
immigrant differ. In Norway, the immigrant or ethnic population covers the foreign-born and 
those with two parents born abroad, while in the Netherlands and the UK, one foreign-born 
parent suffices. Thus, the Norwegian immigrant population is more narrowly defined. For the 
Netherlands, gross wages are available from administrative data while for the UK, net wages 
are reported by respondents themselves and income in Norway also includes benefits. Thus, 
Dutch wages are closest to what theory demands; effects for the UK and Norway may be 
swamped by measurement errors. For Norway, people employed at least 4 hours are 
identifiable while for the Netherlands and UK, only people working 12 hours and more enter 
the analyses. If wages are more flexible for small jobs, we may pick up more effects in 
Norway, although the difference in impact of cut-off levels may be minor. Local labour 
markets are measured by geographical areas as available in the national data.  This is a 
county for the UK and Norway, and both a COROP-area and municipality for the 
Netherlands; all are measured as residential area rather than work area, except for the 
Netherlands, where wages are based on the work area but population statistics are based on 
the living area. None of these properly measures a labour market area, although the Dutch 
COROP comes closest, as deliberately designed for economic coherence.  
The labour markets of the Netherlands and Norway are highly organised and the bottom of 
the wage structure is protected by minimum wage legislation and an advanced welfare 
system. The UK labour market is characterised by a relatively wide range of the wage 
distribution, and is commonly taken as more flexible than in the other countries. Norway is 
the youngest immigration country and has a relatively large influx of immigrants from the 
Nordic countries and Western Europe. The Netherlands has immigrants from its former 
colonies. Both have guest workers and asylum seekers. The UK has immigrants mainly from 
(English speaking) Asian, African and Caribbean Common Wealth countries, with only 
recently large immigration flows from non-English speaking countries, mostly refugees. The 
UK has not recruited large numbers of ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s. 
As Table 7.1 indicates, the most striking general finding is the very small wage effect of 
immigrants. Effects are estimated with greatest precision in the Netherlands, possibly because 
the wage data are most reliable. In the UK, with self-reported net wages, none of the 
coefficients is significant. In the Netherlands, immigrants are substitutes for low skilled and 
complements for higher skilled, which is in line with dominance of low skilled “guest-
workers”. In Norway immigrants come out as complements with lower skilled, which would 
fit a dominance of higher skilled immigrants from the open Nordic labour market. The results 
are not in line with the UK having the most flexible wages. 
As noted, we cannot identify the underlying parameters of the Altonji-Card model. But with 
equation (10), we can calculate the implications of the estimates for some parameters if we 
make assumptions on the others. For example, under reasonable assumptions, the estimates of 
wage effects by skill level for the Netherlands in Table 7.1 can be shown to imply rather high 
labour demand elasticities. Conversely, if we fix the demand elasticities, the estimate simply 
rather high cross-elasticities. The value of such exercises of course depends on the confidence 
one has in the a priori fixed parameters. The estimates of wage effects just give a joint region 
for all the implied parameters.  
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Table 7.1 Impact of  “All immigrants” on native wages 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH
NL -.036 .031  .058 
Norway, 1996  .025 .020                           -.013 
Norway, 1989  .070 .092                          -.088 
UK                           -.005                           -.014                           .018 
Bold:  Significant at least at 5% level. 
 
Table 7.2 shows that the effects of immigrants on their own wages are much bigger. Whereas 
elasticities for natives’ wages are (far) below 0.15, effects on immigrants’ own wages easily 
reach up to 0.5 and higher.  But they are also estimated with much less precision. In our 
detailed estimates for natives’ wages, about half the number of coefficients has t values above 
1.96, while this holds for about one tenth of the estimates for immigrants’ own wages.  Own 
wage effects mostly have the expected negative sign in the Netherlands, but this does not 
hold for the UK and certainly not for Norway. But we know that for Norway, it would be 
most difficult to estimate effects with precision. 
                    
Table 7.2. Impact of immigrants on their own wages  
Norway NL 
1989 1996
UK 
West-European     -.063   Nordic .261 .113 Black -.213
Turkish -.064  EU     .037 .125 Indian -.174
Moroccan      .011  East-Eur     .843 -.084 Pakistan .488
Surinamese  -.310  World    .723 -.039 Mixed .619
Antillean     -.095    
Bold: Significant at least at 5% level. 
 
Since composition effects in the skill level of immigrants may be important, we have selected 
some immigrants groups where the skill level can be fairly reliably assessed. As high skilled 
immigrants, we can identify Western immigrants in the Netherlands, Nordic and EU 
immigrants in Norway and Blacks in the UK (Blacks are quite close to Whites in education 
and occupational composition). One might then anticipate these immigrants to be substitutes 
for high skilled natives, and complements to low skilled natives. As Table 7.3 indicates, this 
is not the dominant pattern.  The situation in Norway comes closest, but the pattern is not 
supported by high significance levels.   
We have made a similar selection for immigrants of whom the skill level is low beyond any 
doubt. We might then anticipate a negative wage effect for the low skilled and a positive 
effect for the higher skilled, as we found for the Netherlands with the GPD data (Table 4.1). 
Again, this is not the picture that convincingly emerges (Table 7.4).   
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Table 7.3. Impact of high skilled immigrants 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Women  Men  Women Men Women  Men  
NL     
Western       -.031   -.042       .002   -.011     .008   .000
Norway   
Nordic, 1996          .039 .057 .072 -.063 -.061 -.017
Nordic, 1989 -.074 -.013         .022 -.029 .067 -.208
EU, 1996         .057 .033        -.012 .012 .027 .083
EU, 1989 .052 .027         -.001 .080 -.009 -.060
UK  
Blacks -.026 -0.20 -.054  .015 -.024 -.031
Bold:  Significant at least at 5% level. 
 
Table 7.4.  Impact of low skilled immigrants 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH
NL  
Turks -.025 -.018 -.009
Moroccans                         .018                          .012  .009
Norway  
World, 89                        .063                        .028 .104
World, 96                         .029  .119 -.155
Bold: Significant at least at 5% level. 
 
A final comparison can be made for immigrants from former colonies (Table 7.5). These 
immigrants generally have a good command of the relevant language and have usually been 
educated in a school system set up by the former rulers. Predictions on labour market impact 
are still hard to make, however, without considering the skill composition. In the 
Netherlands, Antilleans have education levels close to the Dutch, whereas the Surinamese 
lean more towards the lower levels. Antilleans as complements to the medium educated 
Dutch does make sense in this respect. As expected, Surinamese are complements to the 
high-educated Dutch. In the UK, Pakistani and Bangladeshi are clearly low skilled, while the 
Indian population is bi-polar, relative to Whites: both high educated and low educated are 
more frequent. Low skilled Pakistani as substitutes for low skilled natives is clearly 
supported. Indian as complements to medium skilled Whites also fits the pattern. But 
generally, the wage effects are quite weak, just as for immigrants from other sources.        
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Table 7.5.  Impact of immigrants from former colonies 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Women Men Women Men Women  Men
NL  
Surinamese    -.001  .028 -.067 .068       .083 .145
Antilleans     .042       -.012 .099      .000       .030 -.027
UK.   
Indian       .014 .014 .000     .019  .056 .011
Pakistani  -.019  -.032   -.020 -.026  -.016 .005
* Significant at least at 5% level. 
   
Overall, we are inclined to take our key finding of low wage effects as a very real result. 
While one may always aim for better data, sharper models, more refined econometrics, we 
think that the effect of immigrants on native’s wages is genuinely small. And in small, almost 
negligible effects it is hard to detect robust patterns. We also believe that the finding of larger 
wage effects on immigrants themselves hints at a real effect, even though the precision of 
these estimates is even less than for natives. So, we conclude that a more extensive search for 
immigration effects on natives’ wages will not pay off, while a more extensive search on own 
wage effects is a worthwhile target for further work.     
Still, we should point out that our results contrast with two studies for the German labour 
market. De New and Zimmermann (1994) find a very large adverse effect of foreign labour 
on the wages of German workers, comparing native wages and immigrant concentration in 
industries rather than regions between 1984 and 1989 in Germany. They estimate a wage 
elasticity of –4.1.  Hatzius (1994) estimates even larger effects. Similar to our approach, he 
correlates changes in natives’ wages with immigrant percentages across regional labour 
markets between 1984 and 1991. However, Pischke and Velling (1997) find no indication 
that immigration has an impact on wages. The effects on wages we find for three European 
countries are small compared to those usually estimated for the United States (Friedberg and 
Hunt, 1995; Borjas, 1999). This would fit in with the generally held opinion that in Europe, 
wages are more rigid than in the US. However, the accompanying hypothesis that in Europe 
immigration would noticeably affect unemployment does not meet with unambiguous support 
(Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1993; Hatzius, 1994; Pischke and Velling, 1997). Finally, 
we note that our results of larger wage effects on immigrants than on natives also echoes 
American findings. So, while our results may not be very precise in quantitative terms, they 
seem to be quite reliable in terms of orders of magnitude20 
                                                 
20 Recently, Borjas (2002) estimated wage effects by focussing on immigrant shares in education-experience 
cells. This circumvents the problem of defining labour markets and the problem of endogenous immigrant 
shares.  He reports a wage elasticity of about 0.4, much bigger than usually found. We are unable to replicate 
Borjas’ analysis as the data are simply not available.  
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APPENDIX:  BASIC WAGE REGRESSIONS 
 
Appendix to chapter 4 the Netherlands 
 
Table A4.1. Estimates of logarithmic weekly wages for low, medium and high skilled native Dutch 
workers, Netherlands, GPD 1998 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant 5.244 37.00 5.396 48.36 5.305 56.67 
Age 0.008 1.88 0.004 1.66 0.012 4.83 
Tenure 0.007 5.66 0.007 6.80 0.005 4.32 
Working hours 0.014 7.78 0.016 11.36 0.012 10.04 
Experience 0.022 4.36 0.016 3.98 0.022 6.61 
Experience Squared -0.001 6.39 -0.003 3.69 -0.001 7.41 
Single 0.015 0.50 -0.042 2.28 -0.036 1.86 
Female -0.238 7.01 -0.166 7.88 -0.171 9.74 
Full-time 0.151 2.80 0.230 4.60 0.344 5.92 
Irregular -0.327 4.25 -0.034 0.66 -0.113 1.97 
Part-time -0.122 1.89 -0.054 1.04 0.086 1.49 
Unskilled worker -0.056 0.72 -0.126 0.80 -0.280 1.87 
Skilled worker 0.043 0.69 -0.027 0.44 0.036 0.42 
Low employee 0.006 0.09 -0.124 1.63 -0.374 3.52 
Medium employee 0.143 2.34 0.647 1.09 0.038 0.89 
High employee 0.315 4.21 0.237 3.86 0.186 4.42 
Low official 0.021 0.30 0.080 1.02 -0.130 1.55 
Medium official 0.164 2.55 0.109 1.73 0.089 2.12 
High official 0.217 1.73 0.351 4.53 0.209 4.74 
Starting entrepreneur 0.443 1.55 -0.122 0.87 -0.101 0.60 
Retail trade 0.038 0.34 0.097 1.14 0.069 0.32 
Manager/owner firm 0.308 2.41 0.320 3.88 0.233 2.85 
Manager employee 0.666 5.84 0.427 3.39 0.342 6.42 
Student 0.010 0.09 -0.338 1.99 -0.579 4.37 
Private sector -0.011 0.35 0.024 1.18 0.057 2.73 
Large city (>100 000) 0.032 1.19 0.008 0.42 0.004 0.22 
Small city (<20 000) -0.002 0.06 -0.008 0.40 0.009 0.44 
Percentage of EU 0.007 0.65 -0.000 0.02 -0.009 1.37 
Percentage of Non-EU -0.004 2.26 -0.001 0.50 0.002 2.01 
R2 0.45 0.51 0.47 
N 1682 2809 3424 
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Table A.4.2. Log weekly earnings, IV Estimations, Dutch, LSO data 1997 
 low med high women men 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t
Perc Western -0.005 -2.76 -0.001 -1.18 0.000 0.14 0.000 0.11 -0.001 -2.05
Perc Turks -0.011 -4.18 -0.008 -5.99 -0.003 -1.39 -0.007 -3.83 -0.009 -6.52
Perc Moroccans 0.010 1.64 0.006 2.27 0.004 1.10 0.006 1.77 0.007 2.56
Perc Surnamese 0.003 0.16 -0.001 -0.10 0.041 3.95 -0.012 -1.25 0.030 3.62
Perc Antilleans 0.029 0.44 0.080 2.51 -0.034 -0.79 0.104 2.70 0.002 0.06
Edu2 0.106 11.53 0.024 1.69 0.069 6.83
Edu3   0.028 2.05 0.090 12.62
Edu4   0.051 6.20 0.091 5.72 0.185 15.19
Edu5   0.072 15.96 0.135 10.29 0.155 21.98
Edu6   0.234 15.68 0.318 35.80
Edu7   0.1587 23.6 0.381 21.48 0.485 44.44
Experience  0.066 37.61 0.050 58.13 0.040 29.97 0.049 46.20 0.050 60.69
Exper. sq. -0.001 -32.49 -0.001 -49.57 -0.001 -17.93 -0.001 -38.21 -0.001 -47.31
Hours 0.040 46.54 0.041 93.79 0.049 80.58 0.042 103.11 0.045 76.16
Tenure 0.001 14.90 0.001 38.41 0.001 19.52 0.001 31.18 0.000 25.78
Full-time 0.826 23.48 0.830 45.08 1.037 30.87 0.805 43.25 0.879 37.78
Part-time 0.835 25.54 0.867 51.78 1.118 34.42 0.891 51.22 0.891 40.31
Child0-5 0.019 1.34 0.032 6.06 0.044 6.05 0.042 5.43 0.014 2.91
Child0-5 + 0.030 1.63 0.036 5.57 0.076 8.76 0.044 4.61 0.033 5.75
Child6-11 -0.022 -1.70 -0.036 -6.61 0.004 0.54 -0.057 -6.74 -0.012 -2.48
Child6-11 + -0.070 -3.63 -0.044 -6.03 0.012 1.30 -0.101 -8.03 -0.010 -1.80
Child12-17 -0.125 -10.53 -0.062 -11.20 -0.023 -2.79 -0.113 -13.51 -0.044 -8.92
Child12-17+  -0.146 -8.70 -0.067 -9.19 -0.024 -2.50 -0.131 -11.80 -0.048 -7.48
Married 0.048 4.78 0.049 11.25 0.087 14.59 0.037 7.04 0.070 15.97
Public sect. 0.022 1.84 0.030 6.46 -0.021 -4.01 0.074 14.29 -0.031 -7.16
Occup. Level2 0.080 6.89 0.074 8.63 -0.019 -0.36 0.046 4.10 0.076 8.66
Occup. Level3 0.155 12.06 0.168 19.67 0.099 1.96 0.182 15.71 0.137 15.83
Occup. Level4 0.325 13.81 0.321 31.87 0.192 3.82 0.270 20.27 0.285 29.11
Occup. Level5 0.321 7.55 0.378 25.03 0.276 5.44 0.341 21.15 0.366 32.26
Amsterdam 0.042 0.38 0.003 0.05 -0.266 -3.86 0.053 0.84 -0.172 -3.06
Rotterdam 0.067 1.24 0.004 0.16 -0.183 -5.71 -0.007 -0.26 -0.080 -3.14
The Hague 0.057 0.61 -0.004 -0.08 -0.208 -3.49 0.086 1.59 -0.147 -3.06
Utrecht 0.007 0.132 0.054 2.01 -0.027 -0.75 0.035 1.09 0.014 0.51
Female -0.123 -10.26 -0.086 -16.09 -0.063 -10.28   
Constant 3.264 74.28 3.503 156.34 3.351 56.46 3.360 134.24 3.225 117
     
N 16,077  72,818 31,397 46,948  73,344 
R-squared 0.73  0.72 0.75 0.69  0.72 
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Table A4.3. Log weekly earnings, OLS-estimations, Ethnic minorities, LSO data 1997 
 EU East-European Non-European Turks Moroccans Surinamese Indonesians Antilleans
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. T
Percentage Western -0.001 -0.24 0.021 2.65 -0.003 -0.52 -0.005 -0.92 0.011 1.84 0.007 1.18 0.004 0.94 0.019 2.46
Percentage Turks -0.012 -1.42 -0.018 -1.22 -0.014 -1.42 -0.021 -2.65 0.006 0.41 -0.012 -1.35 -0.023 -2.28 -0.002 -0.08
Percentage Moroccans 0.000 0.00 -0.023 -0.70 0.008 0.40 -0.013 -0.69 0.004 0.24 -0.044 -2.59 -0.001 -0.03 0.024 0.90
Percentage Caribbean -0.020 -1.06 -0.053 -1.65 0.001 0.04 -0.035 -1.17 0.010 0.39 -0.062 -2.60 0.033 1.42 -0.019 -0.56
Percentage Antilleans 0.080 1.80 0.151 1.77 0.038 0.67 0.140 1.62 -0.017 -0.21 0.150 2.80 -0.024 -0.41 -0.095 -1.07
Edu2 0.032 0.59 0.056 0.54 0.076 1.12 0.054 0.92 -0.186 -2.18 0.014 0.28 0.069 0.95 0.266 1.95
Edu3 0.141 2.58 0.068 0.64 0.228 3.30 0.035 0.67 -0.054 -0.75 0.013 0.28 0.131 1.72 0.166 1.55
Edu4 0.259 4.40 0.172 1.27 0.164 2.41 0.201 2.34 -0.086 -1.07 0.071 0.80 0.107 1.15 0.117 0.69
Edu5 0.142 2.85 0.064 0.64 0.272 4.62 0.124 2.13 0.093 1.45 0.119 2.59 0.115 1.56 0.361 3.44
Edu6 0.294 4.82 0.138 1.11 0.361 4.99 0.222 2.41 0.019 0.19 0.200 3.25 0.312 3.68 0.505 3.74
Edu7 0.463 6.60 0.082 0.55 0.537 6.20 0.377 3.41 -0.029 -0.23 0.385 4.39 0.450 4.22 0.489 2.23
Experience  0.057 9.55 0.027 2.40 0.049 6.21 0.036 4.01 0.030 3.32 0.039 5.91 0.046 4.32 0.051 4.75
Exper. sq. -0.001 -7.98 0.000 -1.53 -0.001 -4.67 -0.001 -3.99 -0.001 -3.41 -0.001 -4.76 -0.001 -3.57 -0.001 -4.06
Hours 0.046 16.59 0.042 10.26 0.042 14.61 0.042 12.11 0.042 9.82 0.050 17.56 0.049 14.96 0.049 10.06
Tenure 0.001 5.25 0.001 4.08 0.001 5.76 0.001 7.05 0.001 5.55 0.001 7.96 0.001 5.71 0.001 4.05
Full-time 0.846 8.14 0.603 4.19 0.862 8.84 0.799 7.07 0.942 7.65 0.522 5.74 0.772 6.39 0.698 4.39
Part-time 0.931 9.55 0.708 4.85 0.869 9.85 0.867 7.98 1.044 8.66 0.747 8.57 0.887 7.31 0.954 5.78
Child0-5 0.022 0.59 0.087 1.28 0.016 0.39 0.012 0.31 0.031 0.62 0.047 1.41 0.043 0.95 0.067 0.95
Child0-5 + 0.127 2.52 0.048 0.41 0.152 2.91 -0.053 -0.82 -0.039 -0.67 0.121 2.13 0.077 0.71 0.152 1.81
Child6-11 -0.053 -1.45 -0.015 -0.22 -0.057 -1.39 0.008 0.19 -0.047 -0.75 -0.004 -0.12 0.030 0.75 0.066 1.22
Child6-11 + -0.023 -0.35 -0.005 -0.07 0.042 0.85 -0.094 -1.84 -0.048 -0.59 0.041 1.02 -0.020 -0.37 0.018 0.19
Child12-17 -0.061 -1.54 -0.047 -0.76 -0.097 -1.84 -0.065 -1.19 -0.104 -1.61 -0.015 -0.46 -0.031 -0.77 -0.010 -0.15
Child12-17 + -0.064 -1.17 -0.055 -0.63 -0.098 -1.77 -0.123 -2.02 -0.112 -1.17 -0.079 -2.03 -0.070 -1.46 0.044 0.50
Married 0.060 2.27 0.054 1.03 0.025 0.73 0.135 2.35 0.140 2.60 0.043 1.61 0.050 1.59 0.003 0.07
Public sect. -0.017 -0.56 0.048 0.83 0.078 2.20 0.057 1.20 0.148 2.36 0.054 1.94 -0.003 -0.11 -0.027 -0.48
Occup. Level2 0.038 0.83 0.104 1.38 -0.110 -2.15 0.012 0.26 0.050 0.99 0.072 1.60 -0.055 -0.76 0.149 1.66
Occup. Level3 0.145 3.17 0.254 3.21 -0.028 -0.55 0.076 1.45 0.102 1.51 0.097 1.93 0.053 0.76 0.161 1.76
Occup. Level4 0.303 5.18 0.512 4.53 0.184 2.72 0.165 1.91 0.391 3.13 0.256 4.02 0.235 2.90 0.283 2.31
Occup. Level5 0.338 5.10 0.762 4.64 0.137 1.48 0.229 1.79 0.323 2.83 0.376 4.63 0.345 3.28 0.453 2.73
Amsterdam 0.184 1.11 0.496 1.63 0.049 0.28 0.160 0.61 -0.217 -0.93 0.699 3.43 -0.077 -0.39 0.014 0.04
Rotterdam 0.126 1.05 0.341 1.68 -0.032 -0.26 0.209 1.23 -0.152 -0.90 0.423 3.00 0.077 0.54 0.205 0.85
The Hague 0.226 1.57 0.404 1.50 0.086 0.61 0.261 1.18 -0.154 -0.79 0.570 3.38 -0.083 -0.51 0.125 0.47
Utrecht 0.169 1.58 0.201 0.75 -0.017 -0.11 0.177 1.16 -0.207 -1.34 0.446 3.35 0.079 0.56 0.007 0.03
Female -0.092 -2.98 -0.172 -3.05 -0.035 -0.95 -0.112 -2.35 -0.117 -1.85 -0.095 -2.95 -0.041 -1.07 -0.169 -2.67
Constant 3.1508 21.3 3.559 15.72 3.351 23.70 3.609 19.32 3.398 16.31 3.462 21.68 3.108 14.28 2.856 10.98
N 2067  575 1552 1105 682 1585 1282 528
R-sq. 0.70  0.69 0.69 0.67 0.73 0.7 0.73 0.72
Table A.4.4. Wage elasticities by skill and gender, with respect to ethnic minorities 
(municipality), based on IV-estimations, LSO data 1997  
Change in the wage of With respect 
to share of Low skilled Dutch Med-skilled Dutch High-skilled Dutch 
 Men Women men women men women 
 Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t
Western -0.042 -2.03 -0.031 -1.39 -0.011 -1.44 0.002 0.20 0.000 -0.02 0.008 0.50
Turks -0.023 -3.01 -0.024 -2.47 -0.019 -5.15 -0.013 -2.77 -0.013 -1.67 -0.004 -0.41
Moroccans 0.021 1.56 0.016 0.86 0.016 2.37 0.012 1.43 0.009 0.87 0.012 0.90
Surinamese 0.028 0.49 -0.001 -0.02 0.068 2.74 -0.067 -2.28 0.145 3.62 0.083 1.89
Antilleans -0.012 -0.22 0.042 0.69 0.000 -0.01 0.099 3.02 -0.022 -0.49 0.030 -0.58
 
 
Table A.4.5. Wage elasticities by skill, with respect to immigrants first generation only 
(municipality), based on IV-estimations, LSO data 1997.  
Change in the wage of With respect 
to share of Low skilled 
Dutch 
Med-skilled 
Dutch High-skilled Dutch Dutch women Dutch men 
 Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t
EU -0.015 -2.01 0.000 0.06 0.001 0.08 -0.003 -0.73 0.002 0.43
Turks -0.025 -3.95 -0.015 -5.90 -0.007 -1.14 -0.015 -3.58 -0.016 -6.22
Moroccans 0.018 1.70 0.120 2.43 0.010 1.20 0.015 2.39 0.014 2.69
Surinamese 0.022 0.63 0.014 0.76 0.135 4.00 -0.024 -1.13 0.109 5.37
Antilleans 0.005 0.12 0.052 2.55 -0.036 -1.11 0.041 1.58 0.002 0.09
Indonesian -0.020 -0.73 -0.020 -1.90 -0.001 -0.07 0.029 2.25 -0.036 -3.53
 
 
Table A.4.6 Wage elasticities by skill, with respect to ethnic minorities (COROP), based on 
IV-estimations unless otherwise indicated, LSO data 1997. 
Change in the wage ofWith respect to 
share of Low skilled 
Dutch 
Med-skilled 
Dutch
High-skilled 
Dutch Dutch women Dutch men
 Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t Elast. t
Western -0.055 -2.93 -0.002* -0.54 -0.019 -1.78 0.015 1.42 -0.024 -2.05
Turks -0.041 -3.83 -0.012* -3.91 -0.021 -1.90 -0.015 -2.13 -0.042 -6.52
Moroccans 0.026 1.25 0.015* 2.95 0.020 1.24 0.019 1.54 0.010 2.56
Surinamese -0.058 -1.49 0.003* 0.42 0.068 2.10 -0.018 -0.72 -0.010 3.62
Antilleans 0.088 2.07 0.036* 4.32 -0.007 -0.17 0.046 1.59 0.075 0.06
Two pooled ethnic minority groups   
Western  -0.039 -2.13 0.003* 0.75 -0.005 -0.50 0.022 2.07 -0.008 -1.15
Non-Western 0.025 1.46 0.039* 8.03 0.099 8.58 0.041 3.89 0.073 10.26
All ethnic minority groups   
All ethnic 
minorities -0.024 -0.96 0.044 4.48 0.070 5.46 0.058 4.13 0.047 5.39
* these elasticities are based on OLS estimations.  
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Table A.4.7. Wage elasticities by skill and gender, with respect to ethnic minorities 
(COROP), based on IV-estimations unless otherwise indicated, LSO data 1997 
Change in the wage of With respect 
to share of Low skilled Dutch * Med-skilled Dutch High-skilled Dutch * 
 men Women men Women men women 
 Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t
Western -0.002 -0.14 -0.002 -0.13 -0.020 -2.47 0.021 1.58 0.015 1.75 -0.007 -0.68
Turks -0.017 -2.14 -0.020 -1.77 -0.036 -5.59 -0.012 -1.43 -0.004 -0.58 -0.014 -1.55
Moroccans 0.030 2.38 0.030 1.37 0.015 1.35 0.015 0.98 0.018 1.59 0.017 1.16
Surinamese -0.001 -0.03 0.028 1.02 -0.017 -0.84 -0.073 -2.28 0.040 2.43 0.020 1.00
Antilleans 0.021 0.93 0.005 0.14 0.073 3.01 0.095 2.64 0.024 1.18 0.025 1.02
* these elasticities are based on OLS estimations  
 
 
Table A.4.8 Wage elasticities by skill, with respect to immigrants first generation only 
(COROP), based on IV-estimations unless otherwise indicated, LSO data 1997. 
Change in the wage of With respect to 
share of Low skilled 
Dutch 
Med-skilled 
Dutch * 
High-skilled 
Dutch * Dutch women Dutch men 
 Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t Elastic t Elastic. t
EU -0.028 -2.09 -0.002 -0.64 -0.001 -0.33 -0.001 -0.13 -0.009 -1.83
Turks -0.044 -4.002 -0.013 -4.29 -0.011 -1.74 -0.017 -2.32 -0.038 -6.29
Moroccans 0.025 1.325 0.013 2.74 0.013 1.46 0.018 1.54 0.020 2.30
Surinamese -0.045 -0.994 0.001 0.07 0.015 1.01 -0.041 -1.41 0.051 2.40
Antilleans 0.088 2.024 0.025 3.22 0.013 0.89 0.034 1.12 0.036 1.68
Indonesian -0.029 -0.948 0.019 2.71 0.032 2.93 0.047 2.68 -0.047 -3.51
* these elasticities are based on OLS estimations  
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Appendix to chapter 5: UK 
 
Table A5.1. Estimated log weekly earnings of Whites 
 LOW MED HIGH 
 MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Experience 0.023 10.59 0.033 15.74 0.027 8.42 0.030 13.74 0.025 9.45 0.032 12.18
Experience sq. 0.000 -11.97 -0.001 -15.77 -0.001 -9.08 -0.001 -14.22 -0.001 -9.82 -0.001 -12.05
Tenure  0.010 10.90 0.007 9.14 0.012 9.19 0.006 8.23 0.012 7.88 0.007 7.49
Working hours  0.025 27.22 0.011 16.78 0.020 18.92 0.009 15.40 0.012 13.71 0.007 10.62
Perc. Black  -0.016 -2.31 -0.017 -2.04 0.012 1.10 -0.034 -4.90 -0.023 -1.75 -0.018 -1.69
Perc. Indian 0.010 1.98 0.009 1.54 0.015 2.22 0.000 0.01 0.008 0.66 0.039 4.14
Perc. Pakist -0.042 -4.88 -0.023 -3.81 -0.045 -3.17 -0.028 -3.64 -0.009 -0.56 -0.032 -2.48
Perc. Mixed 0.033 4.24 0.032 3.87 0.019 1.46 0.035 4.56 0.016 1.16 0.028 3.04
Single  -0.137 -6.50 -0.186 -11.37 -0.048 -1.77 -0.176 -10.36 -0.017 -0.79 -0.180 -8.83
Married+livtog  0.208 8.89 0.205 9.09 0.134 4.88 0.138 5.29 0.034 1.38 0.057 2.01
Temporary  -0.062 -2.39 -0.065 -2.14 -0.055 -1.70 -0.064 -2.16 -0.057 -2.01 -0.082 -2.18
Manual -0.219 -17.09 -0.214 -14.96 -0.233 -12.36 -0.189 -14.71 -0.394 -10.11 -0.226 -8.01
Part time  -0.338 -18.66 -0.905 -25.64 -0.350 -14.87 -0.809 -22.3 -0.478 -20.9 -0.763 -13.5
Small scale  -0.132 -10.83 -0.143 -9.79 -0.106 -6.38 -0.110 -8.02 -0.140 -6.17 -0.187 -7.41
Private sector  0.079 4.26 -0.055 -2.37 0.062 2.75 -0.051 -2.38 0.056 2.36 -0.079 -3.44
Union member  0.091 4.16 0.053 2.05 0.079 2.61 0.069 2.95 0.103 3.25 -0.030 -0.88
Health problem  -0.032 -2.23 -0.048 -2.90 -0.040 -1.96 -0.041 -2.50 -0.044 -1.89 -0.037 -1.50
Commute  0.087 7.43 0.082 6.90 0.109 7.01 0.087 7.24 0.112 7.21 0.067 4.33
Manufacture  0.071 3.46 0.037 1.96 0.081 2.76 0.030 1.79 0.065 1.83 -0.009 -0.37
Wholesale  -0.145 -8.19 -0.125 -5.43 -0.141 -5.78 -0.147 -7.24 -0.213 -4.66 -0.111 -3.25
Hotels  -0.140 -4.77 -0.129 -2.57 -0.184 -4.61 -0.195 -4.44 -0.154 -2.08 -0.232 -2.42
Transport  0.017 0.55 0.040 1.83 0.073 1.89 0.029 1.10 0.083 1.60 -0.069 -1.54
Real estate  0.046 2.10 0.015 0.45 0.043 1.41 0.032 1.26 0.096 2.79 0.048 1.81
Pub adm.& def.  0.047 1.99 0.042 1.47 0.004 0.15 -0.013 -0.47 0.002 0.06 0.010 0.33
Education  -0.154 -5.84 -0.110 -2.71 -0.048 -1.51 -0.099 -2.36 -0.005 -0.19 -0.022 -0.85
West Yorksh  0.056 2.19 0.017 0.67 -0.006 -0.16 0.049 1.91 0.019 0.52 0.088 2.33
Central London  0.398 9.31 0.370 9.15 0.400 9.34 0.368 8.01 0.285 6.35 0.338 11.31
Inner London  0.227 5.45 0.244 5.69 0.291 7.47 0.255 6.41 0.222 6.16 0.220 6.04
Outer London  0.159 6.48 0.177 6.49 0.128 3.78 0.185 5.92 0.193 6.10 0.111 3.16
Rest of S-East  0.062 4.58 0.083 5.30 0.061 3.19 0.083 5.45 0.066 2.92 0.114 5.98
West Midland  0.023 0.97 0.035 1.41 -0.033 -0.88 0.049 1.91 0.072 2.38 -0.019 -0.56
Autumn  -0.015 -1.11 -0.014 -0.87 0.002 0.10 -0.044 -2.57 -0.051 -1.82 0.022 0.98
Summer  -0.023 -1.93 -0.023 -1.72 0.005 0.32 -0.014 -1.02 -0.035 -2.16 0.017 1.03
Spring  0.011 0.93 0.035 2.65 0.017 1.02 0.009 0.68 0.043 2.59 -0.015 -0.93
Intercept  3.932 90.55 4.639 105.03 4.018 65.43 4.905 123.64 4.712 86.73 5.139 106.57
     
N 7685  5461 3705 5596 3161  3554
R-squared 0.651  0.657 0.627 0.522 0.536  0.427
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Table A5.2. Estimated log weekly earnings of ethnic minorities 
 BLACK INDIAN PAKISTANI MIXED 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T 
Education  0.030 3.64 0.052 6.56 0.014 1.26 0.027 2.24 
Experience  0.025 2.94 0.025 2.89 0.009 0.57 0.027 2.33 
Experience squared  0.000 -2.28 0.000 -2.37 0.000 -0.86 -0.001 -2.26 
Tenure  0.010 2.88 0.012 2.47 0.015 1.60 0.015 2.44 
Working hours  0.017 6.15 0.013 5.62 0.018 3.49 0.015 5.30 
Im90+  -0.015 -0.83 0.016 0.56 0.021 0.67 -0.107 -2.37 
Im8090  -0.016 -0.75 0.010 0.56 -0.040 -2.00 0.080 2.19 
Im7080  -0.059 -1.87 -0.036 -1.24 -0.015 -0.73 -0.045 -1.26 
Im6070  0.043 1.49 0.045 1.58 0.035 1.15 0.021 1.00 
Im4060  0.097 0.90 0.054 0.26 0.222 1.29 0.230 0.93 
Percentage Black -0.105 -0.74 -0.134 -0.64 0.048 0.30 0.098 0.40 
Percentage Indian  0.058 0.45 -0.077 -0.38 0.433 2.66 0.219 0.88 
Percentage Pakistani 0.037 0.29 -0.144 -0.67 0.191 1.16 0.228 0.87 
Percentage Mixed  -0.022 -0.11 0.033 0.09 0.247 0.63 
Manual  -0.114 -2.25 -0.204 -3.73 -0.140 -1.99 0.043 0.65 
Female  -0.133 -2.42 -0.192 -2.94 -0.264 -2.42 -0.120 -1.22 
Single  0.114 1.36 0.055 0.33 0.657 4.09 0.169 1.14 
Married & liv.tog  -0.077 -0.80 0.152 1.88 0.025 0.31 -0.042 -0.49 
Temporary  -0.201 -3.50 -0.201 -3.04 -0.400 -4.11 -0.150 -1.92 
Part time  -0.439 -5.51 -0.420 -4.77 -0.637 -5.40 -0.644 -5.97 
Small scale  -0.088 -1.65 -0.162 -2.16 -0.315 -3.55 -0.137 -1.92 
Private sector  0.067 0.85 -0.008 -0.09 -0.226 -1.25 -0.056 -0.52 
Union member  0.135 1.84 0.111 1.19 -0.012 -0.08 0.178 1.35 
Health problem  -0.074 -1.01 0.065 0.83 0.032 0.27 0.044 0.59 
Commute  0.131 2.68 0.111 2.06 0.180 2.39 0.044 0.64 
Manufacture  0.065 0.81 0.046 0.44 0.134 0.89 -0.079 -0.70 
Wholesale  -0.045 -0.46 -0.216 -2.05 0.004 0.03 -0.402 -3.48 
Hotels  -0.026 -0.24 -0.263 -1.97 -0.353 -1.63 -0.206 -0.93 
Transport  0.190 2.30 0.069 0.69 0.216 1.17 -0.165 -1.34 
Real estate  -0.038 -0.49 0.155 1.77 -0.059 -0.40 0.023 0.20 
Public adm.& def.  0.113 1.59 0.022 0.20 0.294 1.64 0.018 0.15 
Education  -0.179 -1.56 -0.031 -0.27 0.338 1.96 0.033 0.21 
West Yorksh  -0.067 -0.48 0.149 1.44 -0.017 -0.16 -0.072 -0.61 
Central London  0.072 0.93 0.295 2.23 0.045 0.31 0.256 2.42 
Inner London  0.093 1.42 0.129 1.38 0.096 0.87 0.341 3.38 
Outer London  0.124 1.93 0.059 0.83 -0.147 -1.37 0.180 1.73 
Rest of S-East  0.047 0.49 0.110 1.37 -0.108 -1.45 0.204 2.24 
West Midlands  -0.071 -1.19 -0.047 -0.60 -0.112 -1.02 0.176 1.04 
Autumn  -0.011 -0.22 0.002 0.03 -0.099 -1.19 -0.038 -0.48 
Summer  0.037 0.70 -0.118 -2.25 -0.121 -1.73 0.037 0.58 
Spring  0.049 0.95 0.086 1.41 0.076 1.26 -0.092 -1.43 
Intercept  3.924 20.16 3.933 13.97 4.376 13.74 4.006 11.6 
    
N 383 395 175 300  
R-squared 0.686 0.657 0.839 0.690  
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Appendix to chapter 6: Norway 
 
Table A6.1. Estimated log weekly earnings of Norwegian, KIRUT 1996 
 LOW MED HIGH 
 MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Experience 0.043 6.82 0.045 6.55 0.083 22.75 0.078 18.70 0.061 8.17 0.064 6.05
Experience sq. -0.001 -6.69 -0.001 -7.31 -0.002 -19.85 -0.001 -16.09 -0.001 -6.43 -0.001 -5.10
Tenure 0.005 2.97 0.009 3.94 0.005 4.16 0.006 3.86 0.002 0.94 -0.001 -0.23
Hours 2029 0.012 0.11 0.239 6.64 0.152 2.05 0.109 3.45 0.159 1.53 0.302 3.51
Hours 30 + 0.381 5.97 0.543 17.54 0.472 12.39 0.428 18.66 0.306 3.62 0.528 7.60
Edu A -0.103 -1.43 1.253 2.58 0.102 4.47 0.000 0.00 0.131 3.82 0.198 4.06
Edu B -0.045 -0.61 1.200 2.48 0.178 5.36 0.049 1.84 0.122 4.03 0.293 5.08
Edu C -0.068 -0.85 1.306 2.70 0.228 7.56 0.001 0.03 0.301 6.32 0.575 6.41
Edu D 0.051 0.68 1.353 2.81 0.223 5.88 0.318 12.01 0.348 4.63 0.183 2.57
Oslo -0.131 -0.55 -0.009 -0.03 -0.572 -3.44 -0.010 -0.05 -0.142 -0.53 0.747 1.65
Married 0.161 5.01 -0.006 -0.24 0.141 6.28 -0.004 -0.21 0.155 4.42 -0.007 -0.17
Agriculture -0.158 -1.51 -0.270 -1.33 -0.025 -0.33 -0.140 -0.94 -0.278 -1.13 -0.621 -1.25
Mining 0.341 5.78 0.304 1.59 0.258 4.15 0.516 7.72 0.657 11.11 0.698 7.79
Manufacture 0.108 2.31 0.037 0.71 0.002 0.07 0.093 2.13 0.218 2.49 0.130 0.81
Construction 0.072 1.44 -0.099 -1.11 -0.012 -0.39 -0.049 -0.74 0.028 0.31 -0.086 -0.52
Trade 0.126 2.66 0.007 0.18 -0.007 -0.20 -0.098 -2.49 0.347 4.76 0.035 0.28
Hotel 0.011 0.09 -0.238 -3.01 -0.065 -1.03 -0.101 -1.69 -0.010 -0.09 -0.056 -0.34
Transport 0.123 2.77 0.005 0.08 0.021 0.62 0.115 2.36 0.257 3.37 0.366 3.39
Finance 0.075 1.03 0.082 1.29 0.141 4.36 0.082 2.28 0.202 2.93 0.283 2.96
Education -0.270 -2.26 -0.078 -1.12 -0.179 -3.66 -0.099 -2.76 -0.086 -1.91 -0.044 -0.97
Health -0.046 -0.46 0.062 1.33 -0.170 -3.30 0.054 1.94 0.132 2.14 0.013 0.17
Public sector -0.096 -1.93 -0.010 -0.26 -0.127 -4.13 -0.058 -2.11 0.030 0.64 -0.065 -1.10
Govern. Official 0.125 4.91 0.201 6.79 0.098 5.22 0.110 4.71 0.092 3.26 0.125 2.96
Percentage Nordic 0.040 1.84 0.027 1.07 -0.044 -2.71 0.048 2.52 -0.010 -0.31 -0.037 -0.93
Percentage EU 0.026 0.87 0.044 1.47 0.009 0.48 -0.009 -0.39 -0.052 -1.72 0.018 0.36
Percentage EUR -0.108 -1.38 -0.217 -2.42 -0.035 -0.52 -0.080 -1.25 0.086 0.99 0.324 2.39
Percentage world 0.028 0.52 0.018 0.31 0.137 3.97 0.028 0.69 0.056 0.94 -0.188 -1.82
Intercept 7.214 64.89 5.664 11.38 6.874 107.67 6.848 120.65 7.423 55.35 7.114 55.50
N 3173 3977 5672 4921 1312 1024
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.32
Dummy variables Edu A, B, C and D represent the years of schooling within skill levels.  The lowest schooling 
level within each skill category is the reference group. These dummies indicate 7, 8, 9,10 years of schooling for 
low skilled sample, 12, 13, 14, and 15 years of schooling for medium skilled sample, and 17, 18, 19 and 20 
years of schooling for high skilled sample.  
Regression equations also include 9 dummies for the number of children aged 0-11 and 12-18 years, but the 
parameters are not presented. 
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Table A6.2. Estimated log weekly earnings of immigrants, KIRUT 1996 
 NORDIC EU EAST-EUR WORLD 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Experience 0.050 7.92 0.032 3.99 0.050 2.46 0.041 3.17 
Experience sq. -0.001 -7.04 -0.001 -3.26 -0.001 -1.12 -0.001 -3.18 
Tenure 0.012 4.54 0.009 3.76 0.043 2.76 0.019 1.92 
Gender -0.235 -6.57 -0.289 -7.72 -0.513 -3.01 -0.257 -3.63 
Hours 2029 0.221 3.52 0.425 5.09 0.249 0.93 -0.010 -0.10 
Hours 30 + 0.464 8.55 0.645 11.83 0.377 2.28 0.233 3.15 
Education 0.062 10.75 0.072 9.94 0.078 2.53 0.026 1.76 
Oslo -0.191 -0.56 0.029 0.07 -2.145 -1.60 0.275 0.30 
Married 0.065 1.90 0.157 2.97 0.176 1.07 0.229 2.60 
Agriculture -0.121 -0.62 -0.716 -2.01 -0.781 -2.32 0.232 0.89 
Mining 0.337 3.86 0.369 4.53 -0.159 -0.54   
Manufacture 0.095 1.78 0.126 1.58 -0.428 -1.81 0.276 2.03 
Construction 0.075 1.06 0.136 1.57 -0.376 -1.76 0.003 0.02 
Trade 0.019 0.30 0.075 0.90 -0.203 -0.88 0.128 0.85 
Hotel -0.085 -1.13 -0.129 -1.04 -0.480 -1.91 -0.056 -0.35 
Transport -0.057 -0.80 0.273 2.68 -0.241 -0.79 0.440 3.09 
Finance 0.058 0.77 0.065 0.75 0.219 0.82 0.458 2.65 
Education -0.246 -2.66 -0.263 -2.99 -0.083 -0.31 0.192 1.29 
Health -0.021 -0.37 0.015 0.19 0.339 1.32 0.284 1.72 
Public sector -0.103 -1.99 -0.077 -0.97 -0.519 -2.68 0.269 2.04 
Govern. Official 0.117 2.11 0.212 4.03 0.603 1.96 0.332 2.81 
Percentage Nordic 0.061 1.86 0.049 1.19 -0.003 -0.01 0.093 1.22 
Percentage EU -0.034 -0.95 0.068 1.68 -0.101 -0.69 -0.122 -1.05 
Percentage EUR 0.164 1.23 -0.048 -0.34 -0.120 -0.29 -0.326 -1.15 
Percentage world 0.046 0.61 -0.018 -0.18 0.511 1.56 -0.011 -0.05 
Intercept  6.309 45.03 6.127 36.44 5.971 9.46 6.934 21.84 
     
N 1549  1373 220 760  
R-squared 0.39  0.47 0.61 0.21  
 
Regression equations also include 9 dummies for the number of children aged 0-11 and 12-18 
years, but the parameters are not presented. 
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Table A6.3. Estimated log weekly earnings of Norwegians, KIRUT 1989 
 LOW MED HIGH
 MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Experience 0.035 5.92 0.061 9.35 0.047 10.81 0.030 4.15 0.035 1.89 0.050 2.75
Experience sq. -0.001 -6.04 -0.001 -9.12 -0.001 -11.27 -0.001 -4.06 -0.001 -1.90 -0.001 -2.62
Tenure 0.004 2.81 0.004 2.38 0.007 5.12 0.007 4.18 0.005 2.09 0.005 1.00
Hours 2029 0.132 1.41 0.226 7.56 0.010 0.11 0.154 4.40 -0.049 -0.70 0.075 0.86
Hours 30 + 0.460 7.98 0.504 19.88 0.331 8.71 0.437 16.12 0.084 1.45 0.295 3.94
Edu A -0.084 -1.74 0.038 2.30 0.024 1.03 0.035 0.70 -0.015 -0.16
Edu B -0.031 -0.91 0.074 1.25 0.243 10.38 0.126 4.54 0.130 4.09 0.152 2.34
Edu C   0.068 1.15 0.193 7.84 0.136 3.64 0.225 3.19 
Edu D 0.058 2.58 0.180 3.37 0.188 5.14 0.221 7.49 0.272 4.07 0.140 2.00
Oslo -0.357 -2.31 0.110 0.70 -0.065 -0.58 -0.155 -0.99 0.093 0.31 -0.213 -0.65
Married 0.177 4.74 -0.030 -1.17 0.133 6.09 0.038 1.51 0.144 3.64 -0.073 -2.01
Agriculture -0.284 -2.55 -0.460 -2.17 -0.182 -2.42 -0.065 -0.54 0.192 2.53 -1.317 -1.65
Mining 0.325 5.11 0.537 3.67 0.269 4.60 0.481 8.05 0.394 3.98 0.707 7.03
Manufacture 0.079 2.28 -0.016 -0.38 0.054 2.30 0.095 2.13 0.037 0.32 0.444 3.13
Construction 0.024 0.62 0.079 1.26 -0.019 -0.69 0.143 1.79 -0.021 -0.21 0.103 1.00
Trade 0.047 1.26 -0.094 -2.68 0.036 1.24 0.014 0.31 0.200 3.16 0.353 2.34
Hotel -0.063 -0.63 -0.278 -3.45 0.036 0.72 -0.269 -2.50 -0.161 -2.09 
Transport 0.052 1.45 0.069 1.59 0.072 2.50 0.099 1.82 0.275 3.23 0.727 11.09
Finance 0.042 0.75 0.069 1.44 0.150 5.79 0.126 3.26 0.145 1.79 0.423 5.53
Education -0.052 -0.86 -0.062 -1.49 -0.192 -3.74 -0.046 -1.10 -0.115 -2.74 0.049 0.70
Health -0.181 -1.67 0.063 1.88 -0.077 -1.93 0.100 3.10 -0.079 -1.39 0.050 0.48
Public sector -0.114 -2.80 -0.004 -0.15 -0.077 -3.11 -0.024 -0.78 -0.033 -0.83 0.002 0.03
Govern. Official 0.191 9.01 0.152 6.78 0.082 4.11 0.207 9.44 -0.052 -1.43 0.075 1.76
Percentage 
Nordic 
-0.008 -0.49 -0.047 -2.42 -0.018 -1.41 0.013 0.81 -0.119 -3.36 0.036 1.31
Percentage EU 0.017 1.70 0.031 2.76 0.047 6.61 0.000 -0.03 -0.032 -2.29 -0.005 -0.18
Percentage EUR 0.015 0.32 -0.011 -0.22 0.017 0.36 -0.016 -0.36 0.226 3.05 -0.095 -0.59
Percentage 
world 
0.048 1.76 0.007 0.26 0.000 -0.01 0.025 0.90 -0.002 -0.04 0.054 0.85
Intercept 7.234 77.33 6.681 70.60 7.480 119.76 7.236 91.71 8.352 36.39 7.439 33.52
     
N 2594  3099 3347 2880 653  439
R-squared 0.17  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.27  0.34
Dummy variables Edu A, B, C and D represent the years of schooling within skill levels.  The 
lowest schooling level within each skill category is the reference group. These dummies 
indicate 7, 8, 9,10 years of schooling for low skilled sample, 12, 13, 14, and 15 years of 
schooling for medium skilled sample, and 17, 18, 19 and 20 years of schooling for high 
skilled sample. Regression equations also include 9 dummies for the number of children aged 
0-11 and 12-18 years, but the parameters are not presented. 
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Table A6.4. Estimated log weekly earnings of immigrants, KIRUT 1989 
 NORDIC EU EAST-EUR WORLD 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Experience 0.004 0.50 0.005 0.44 -0.044 -1.43 -0.018 -1.14 
Experience sq. 0.000 -0.90 0.000 -0.62 0.001 2.13 0.000 -0.26 
Tenure 0.008 3.26 0.013 4.19 -0.017 -1.11 0.002 0.31 
Gender -0.262 -7.26 -0.230 -5.38 -0.251 -2.42 -0.217 -3.42 
Hours 2029 0.201 2.46 0.490 6.82 -0.063 -0.26 0.028 0.31 
Hours 30 + 0.597 8.66 0.742 11.80 0.240 1.52 0.102 1.61 
Education 0.059 10.21 0.066 9.68 0.043 2.38 0.037 3.13 
Oslo -0.531 -1.58 -1.008 -2.66 0.289 0.19 -0.299 -0.64 
Married 0.025 0.60 0.169 3.18 -0.043 -0.33 0.154 2.13 
Agriculture -0.008 -0.06 -0.254 -2.24 -0.236 -0.77 -0.218 -0.58 
Mining 0.408 5.39 0.199 0.73 0.666 4.10 
Manufacture 0.088 1.51 0.217 2.06 0.198 0.85 0.112 1.44 
Construction -0.124 -1.39 0.040 0.33 0.037 0.36 
Trade 0.022 0.30 0.175 1.69 0.559 2.48 -0.228 -1.93 
Hotel -0.198 -1.97 -0.106 -0.72 0.190 0.56 -0.224 -2.56 
Transport 0.118 1.87 0.343 2.81 0.779 3.25 0.139 1.35 
Finance 0.270 3.87 0.134 1.17 0.675 2.89 -0.235 -1.83 
Education -0.065 -1.07 -0.054 -0.55 0.229 1.06 0.081 1.07 
Health 0.063 1.20 0.180 1.81 0.525 2.25 -0.133 -1.21 
Public sector -0.105 -1.69 0.031 0.32 0.283 1.25 -0.075 -1.07 
Govern. Official 0.079 1.87 0.165 3.30 0.420 3.33 0.189 3.01 
Percentage Nordic 0.071 2.33 0.076 2.06 -0.076 -0.47 0.041 0.79 
Percentage EU -0.007 -0.30 -0.010 -0.30 0.061 0.57 -0.072 -1.76 
Percentage EUR 0.051 0.66 0.014 0.14 0.480 1.25 -0.126 -0.76 
Percentage world 0.055 0.88 0.141 2.06 -0.172 -0.63 0.097 1.13 
Intercept  6.867 43.74 6.171 31.36 7.764 17.54 7.825 32.18 
     
N 1367  1158 181 1065  
R-squared 0.37  0.41 0.46 0.16  
     
 
Regression equations also include 9 dummies for the number of children aged 0-11 and 12-18 
years, but the parameters are not presented. 
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